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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Government's statistical agencies have not yet perfected a
way of measuring which workers have both a "disability" and a job.1 Yet,
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1. The federal government's four principal sources for data about the employment of
people with disabilities are the Survey on Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the
Centers for Disease Control's National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the Current
Population Survey (CPS) and the Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS).
Both the CPS and the SIPP are administered jointly by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Yet, these survey instruments each use different definitions of "disability."
Compare ERIKA STEINMETZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2002,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P70-107, 2 fig. 1 (2006), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p70-107.pdf (describing the definitions used in the
SIPP), with PATRICIA F. ADAMS & PATRICIA M. BARNES, M.A., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SVCS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR THE U.S.
POPULATION: NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, 2004 (2006) (Vital and Health
Statistics Series 10 No. 229) (displaying data definitions used in the NHIS), with U.S.
Census Bureau, Disability Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) ASEC,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/disabcps.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007)
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there is little debate that the measures show that working-age Americans
with disabilities are employed at a much lower rate than working-age
Americans without disabilities.2 There is also a general consensus that the
employment rate among all working-age people with disabilities has
declined over the past fifteen years or longer.3 There is a substantial
scholarly debate, however, over whether the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)4 has contributed to these trends. Daron Acemoglu and Joshua
(listing questions used by the CPS to identify a person as having a disability) with U.S.
Census Bureau, Disability-American Community Survey (ACS),
http://www.census.govihhes/www/disability/acs.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (listing
definitions of disabilities used by the ACS). However, ten years after President Bill Clinton
ordered the involved agencies to work together, it appears that significant progress has been
made toward implementing an accurate employment measure for people with disabilities.
See generally Terence McMenamin, Stephen M. Miller, & Anne E. Polivka, Discussion and
Presentation of the Disability Test Results from the Current Population Survey (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics Working Paper No. 396, 2006) (discussing the testing of new screening
questions to be used in the CPS).
2. According to CPS data, the employment rate for working-age people with a "work
disability" was 22%, while the employment rate for working-age people without a disability
was 76%. U.S. Census Bureau, Hous. & Household Econ. Statistics Div., Disability -
Selected Characteristics of Persons 16 to 64: 2005, tbl.2,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disability/cps/cps205.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
The ACS found employment rates for working-age people with and without disabilities in
2005, respectively, of 38% and 78%. REHAB. RESEARCH & TRAINING CTR. ON DISABILITY
DEMOGRAPHICS & STATISTICS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, 2005 DISABILITY STATUS REPORTS
UNITED STATES No. 2 (2005), available at http://www.ilr.comell.edu/edi/disabilitystatistics
(follow "get pdf" hyperlink under "2005 Disability Status Report"). The SIPP found that
45% of working-age people with "severe disabilities" were employed in 2002 compared
with 87.7% of working-age people without disabilities. STEINMETZ, supra note 1, at 24.
3. See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser et al., Accounting for the Declining Fortunes of
Working-Age People with Disabilities, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Ashley Stein & Samuel Estreicher, eds., forthcoming
2007) (discussing the decline in the relative employment of working-age persons beginning
in the mid-1980's); THE DECLINE IN THE EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A
POLICY PUZZLE (David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser, eds. 2003) (compiling
several articles discussing this topic) [hereinafter POLICY PUZZLE]. I have emphasized "all"
working-age people with disabilities here because a debate exists over whether the
employment rate among those working-age people with disabilities who are most likely to
be covered by the ADA-a subset of all working-age people with disabilities-has declined.
See, e.g., Peter Blanck et al., Calibrating the Impact of the ADA's Employment Provisions,
14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (2003) (claiming that prior studies used measures of
disability that deviate from the ADA's definition); Douglas Kruse & Lisa Schur,
Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 42 INDUS. REL. 31 (2003)
(explaining that problems in measurement may have lead to a perceived decline in
employment among those reporting work disabilities). But see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Has
the Americans with Disabilities Act Reduced Employment for People with Disabilities?, 25
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 527, 539-55 (2004) (critiquing these analyses).
4. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990). The ADA initially covered only employers with 25 or more employees. Beginning
in 1994, the ADA covered employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 1211 1(5)(A)
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Angrist, along with Thomas DeLeire, sparked this debate with their
respective studies of data from the Current Population Survey and the
Survey of Income and Program Participation. Acemoglu & Angrist found
a decline in the employment rate among both men and women with
disabilities between the ages of 21 and 39 beginning in the two years
immediately after the ADA took effect in 1992.' DeLeire found a
substantial decline in the employment rate of men with disabilities
beginning in 1990-immediately after the ADA was passed, but two years
before it took effect.6 The proximity of the ADA's passage to the
employment-rate decline, and analyses which purported to exclude other
potential causes for the decline, led Acemoglu & Angrist and DeLeire to
infer a causal relationship between the ADA and the decline. Richard
Burkhauser and several co-authors recently revisited the Acemoglu &
Angrist study and found substantial reason to doubt its conclusions.'
Nonetheless, the debate had begun and it continues to play an important
role in disabilities law scholarship. This article joins that debate.
The debate surrounding the effect of the ADA on the employment rate
of individuals with disabilities pits a "rational choice" view of employers
and accommodations against a "discriminatory choice" view. Rational
(1994).
5. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 917 (2001).
6. Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCEs 693, 701-05 (2000); see also Thomas DeLeire, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Employment of People with Disabilities, in POLICY
PUZZLE, supra note 3, at 259 (analyzing empirical studies that attribute the decline in
employment among people with disabilities to the ADA rather than other policy inputs).
7. See Burkhauser, supra note 3. This reconsideration of the same data found
equivalent declines in the employment rate of working-age people with disabilities at similar
points in earlier business cycles; therefore, economic recession may explain the
employment-rate decline better than the ADA's effects on employer behavior. Id. at 16-17.
The time horizon in the Acemoglu & Angrist study was too narrow to account for this other
potential cause of the employment-rate decline. In addition, Burkhauser and his co-authors
found that the Acemoglu & Angrist results were contingent upon a particularized definition
of "work disability." Changing the definition-that is, looking at people who self-identified
themselves as having a work disability over two years rather than only one-eliminated the
evidence of a sharp post-ADA employment-rate decline. Id. at 27-28. Both of these
criticisms would apply equally well to the DeLeire study, which is subject to the additional
criticism that it sought to measure the ADA's employment effects before employers were
legally subject to the law. Earlier critics argued that other potential causes that were not
accounted for in these studies, such as increases in Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits recipiency rates, might have caused
the employment-rate decline observed by Acemoglu, Angrist and DeLeire. See, e.g., John
Bound & Timothy Waidmann, Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates Among
the Working-Aged Disabled, Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7975,
2000) (presenting evidence suggesting that the growth in the SSDI program can account for
much of the decline in the employment of the disabled); Kruse & Schur, supra note 3
(arguing that those placed on SSDI or SSI face strong disincentives for returning to work).
2007]
4 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
choice scholars-including Acemoglu & Angrist, DeLeire, Richard
Epstein,' Christine Jolls, 9 and John Donohue,"° among others "-suggest
that the ADA's mandate that employers provide "reasonable
accommodations" ' 2 to workers with disabilities makes these workers more
expensive than workers without disabilities. The ADA requires employers
to accommodate any "qualified individual with a disability" as long as the
accommodation is "reasonable" and does not impose an "undue hardship"
on the employer. 3 An accommodation can be any change to a physical
environment, work schedule, or job responsibility that allows a worker with
a disability to perform the essential functions of his job or to enjoy the
same privileges and benefits as his co-workers. 14 Rational choice scholars
8. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 487-88 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 230-42,
273-82 (2000) (laying out a theory that the effect of the ADA's accommodation mandate
and other such mandates is for the protected group's employment rate to decline); see also
Christine Jolls & J.J. Prescott, Disaggregating Employment Protection: The Case of
Disability Discrimination, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10740,
2004) (comparing state-level employment rates among working-age people with disabilities
before and after the ADA took effect, but also comparing states in which the ADA's
accommodation mandate was an innovation with states that had existing state laws imposing
an equivalent accommodation mandate, and finding that the ADA effected a decline in the
employment rate among working-age people with disabilities for two years after the law
was passed, but did not effect a decline thereafter). But see Jolls, Accommodation
Mandates, supra, at 280 (suggesting that the post-ADA employment-rate decline among
working-age people with disabilities may have been due to this group investing more time in
school because of a higher expected return on those investments); Christine Jolls,
Identifying the Effects of the Americans with Disabilities Act Using State-Law Variation:
Preliminary Evidence on Educational Participation Effects, 94 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 447, 448 (2004) (offering preliminary evidence of Jolls's theory posited in
Accommodation Mandates that the post-ADA employment decline was due to an increase in
working-age people with disabilities seeking educational opportunities).
10. See John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimination Law in Perspective: Three
Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2608-09 (1994) (explicitly endorsing the
thesis that as accommodation costs rise employment rates necessarily decline); John J.
Donohue III, Understanding the Reasons for and Impact of Legislatively Mandated Benefits
for Selected Workers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 897 (2001) [hereinafter Legislatively Mandated
Benefits] (reviewing Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 9) (endorsing Jolls's
theoretical analysis, but raising concerns about the equilibrium model on which she relied).
11. See, e.g., Thomas H. Barnard, Disabling America: Costing Out the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 58 (1992) (noting that employers usually
do not benefit from accommodating an employee with a disability).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"
to be "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires").
13. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2006) (illustrating the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission regulations' definition of "reasonable accommodations").
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assume that accommodations impose new and additional costs on
employers and, as a result, employing a worker with a disability who
requires an accommodation is more costly than employing a worker
without a disability because those without disabilities do not need an
accommodation. Given the choice between workers who are equally
productive, these scholars expect that rational employers will choose to hire
the less costly worker-that is, the worker without a disability-because
that worker's net productivity (i.e., productivity minus labor costs) will be
higher. In economic terms, the ADA's accommodation mandate makes
each unit of labor supplied by workers with disabilities more costly and,
therefore, employers demand less of it. 5 The ADA's accommodation
mandate prices working-age people with disabilities out of the labor market
and, thereby, depresses their employment rate. 16
This Article does not offer a direct critique of the rational choice
position. 7 Rather, it joins the debate in support of the discriminatory
choice view of the relationship between the costs of the accommodation
mandate and the employment rate of working-age people with disabilities.
The discriminatory choice position is more implicit than explicit in the
work of the scholars who promote it. Peter Blanck, often writing with
Helen Schartz, D.J. Hendricks, and other co-authors, has produced several
empirical studies of the costs and benefits of accommodations. 8 These
15. This conclusion assumes, as it must, that labor demand is elastic. I make related
assumptions below about labor supply. See infra note 101.
16. Jolls's position in this debate is more complex than this brief discussion suggests.
See, e.g., Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 9, at 242-61 (discussing different
assumptions regarding the binding nature of employment and wage protections and differing
conclusions depending upon whether accommodations imposed fixed or incremental costs).
Jolls has also argued that accommodation mandates overlap with traditional anti-
discrimination mandates found in employment discrimination laws other than the ADA to
the extent that both types of mandates impose additional costs on employers. See Christine
Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 642 (2001).
Samuel Bagenstos and Michael Stein have also made related arguments. See Samuel R.
Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination, " Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability)
Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different
Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004).
17. I offer such a critique in Seth D. Harris, The Mis-Directed Debate over the
Economics of Disabilities Accommodations, in HUMAN RESOURCES ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR. (Charles J. Whalen, ed., W.E. Upjohn
Inst. 2008) (forthcoming).
18. See Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Part I-Workplace Accommodations, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
877, 901-08 (1997) [hereinafter Economics of Employment Provisions] (discussing PETER D.
BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TRANSCENDING
COMPLIANCE: A CASE REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. (Annenberg Washington
Program Report 1994) and PETER D. BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS,
ROEBUCK AND CO. (Annenberg Washington Program Report 1996)); Peter Blanck et al.,
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studies found that accommodations frequently impose no added cost and,
when they have a cost, are inexpensive.
9 They also found that employers
often benefit from providing accommodations to their incumbent
employees. Among other cost savings, employers who accommodate their
incumbent employees with disabilities avoid searching for and training new
employees and improve the accommodated employees' productivity and
attendance.2 ° Most important, Blanck and his co-authors have found that
the benefits employers derive from accommodations frequently outweigh
their costs-that is, accommodations actually benefit employers as well as
their employees with disabilities.21
The explicit message of these studies is that rational employers should
choose to accommodate their employees with disabilities because
employers will often benefit from that choice. The implicit message is that
the low and declining employment rate among working-age people with
disabilities cannot be attributed to the ADA's accommodation mandate or,
more precisely, its associated costs. 22  The cause must lie elsewhere,
perhaps with irrational, discriminatory choices made by employers who
Workplace Accommodations: Empirical Studies of the ADA, in ASSESSING THE
EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (Michael Ashley Stein
& Samuel Estreicher eds., forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Workplace Accommodations];
D.J. Hendricks et al., Cost and Effectiveness of Accommodations in the Workplace:
Preliminary Results of a Nationwide Study, 25 DISABILITIES STUD. Q. 175 (2005); Helen A.
Schartz, Kevin M. Schartz, D.J. Hendricks & Peter Blanck, Workplace Accommodations:
Empirical Study of Current Employees, 75 MISS. L.J. 917 (2006) (exploring employer and
employee factors in the employer's decision to make accommodations); cf Heidi M. Berven
& Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with Disabilities Act Part II-
Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
9, 84-87 (1998) (arguing that any cost-benefit analysis of the ADA is not complete without
including the unanticipated economic benefits from a rapidly expanding assistive
technology market).
19. See, e.g., Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions, supra note 18, at 902;
Schartz, supra note 18, at 926.
20. See, e.g., Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions, supra note 18, at 902;
Schartz, supra note 18, at 939.
21. See, e.g., Blanck, Economics of Employment Provisions, supra note 18, at 902-04;
Schartz, supra note 18, at 939. But see Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of
Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79, 178-80 (2003) (expressing reservations about
the collection of empirical studies and their ability to measure costs and benefits of
accommodations).
22. This implicit message is consistent with some discriminatory choice scholars'
argument that the employment rate among ADA-protected working-age people with
disabilities has not declined. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. While I generally
support the discriminatory choice view of the employment rate decline, I do not mean to
endorse these scholars' related argument regarding the employment rate data. They are not
inextricably linked. I consider it possible, even likely, that the ADA has not improved the
employment rate among working-age people with disabilities, even though this outcome
cannot be explained in large part or at all by employers responding rationally to added labor
costs arising out of the ADA's accommodation mandate.
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refuse to hire workers with disabilities. Thus, while demand for labor
supplied by working-age Americans with disabilities is lower than it should
be, discrimination-rather than accommodation costs-may be the cause of
that depressed demand.23
This Article provides the theory and analysis which together explain
the results of the empirical studies supporting the discriminatory choice
position. It discusses why accommodating employees with disabilities
often imposes no costs on the employers providing accommodations and
why accommodations may, in appropriate circumstances, yield net benefits
for those employers. The analysis relies on "internal labor market theory,"
an economic theory suggesting that barriers to competition can increase the
efficiency of the relationships between employers and employees. 24 I will
argue that efficient accommodations are not merely facilitated by the
internal labor market's competitive barriers, but rather that employers'
accommodations and employees' impairments are competitive barriers
which increase the efficiency of relationships between employers and their
employees with disabilities.
More specifically, I will argue that accommodations and workers'
impairments tighten the bonds between the employer and the employee and
thereby make possible a range of cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing
behaviors that yield larger dividends for the employer. Thus, the cost of an
accommodation is not the only factor that is relevant to determining
whether an employer will benefit from providing an accommodation to an
incumbent employee with an impairment. The willingness of the parties to
seize the opportunity to make their relationship more productive and cost
efficient-an opportunity created by the accommodation and impairment-
is a critical factor in determining whether an employer benefits from
accommodating an employee with an impairment.
In pristine market conditions, rational economic actors should not
need encouragement to engage in beneficial behavior.25 Assuming that
such conditions ever exist, internal labor market theory explains that many
employment relationships operate in a non-competitive environment-
23. For the classic work on employers indulging a "taste" for discrimination, see GARY
S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
24. I have previously used internal labor market theory to analyze the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the ADA in U.S. Airways v. Barnett. See Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the
Economics of Discrimination: US. Airways v. Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of
Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 123 (2003). I argued that Barnett signaled
that the Supreme Court had been influenced by internal labor market theory in its analysis of
the role of seniority systems in the workplace. Id. at 126-28.
25. For a discussion of reasons why a mandate may be needed to provide such
encouragement, even in a competitive labor market, see Jolls, Accommodation Mandates,
supra note 9, at 246-47.
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really, a bilateral monopoly26-in which the parties are bargaining over the
division of a surplus. As a result, there is room for the ADA to play a role
in enhancing efficiency. In particular, the ADA encourages employers to
accommodate their incumbent employees with impairments through a
system of incentives. Perhaps the most effective of these incentives is the
accommodation mandate,27 which subjects noncompliant employers to
added costs. 28 The ADA's accommodation mandate not only defines the
standard for appropriate treatment of workers with disabilities in American
society, it also either requires or strongly encourages employers to engage
in an interactive process with their employees to find a cost-effective
means of satisfying that standard.29 In sum, this Article tells the story of
26. See infra text accompanying note 52 (discussing how the bilateral monopoly affects
the actions of the employee and employer).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining "discriminate" to include "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such
covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on
the operation of the business of such covered entity").
28. See infra Part III.B (discussing litigation costs associated with reasonable
accommodations claims under the ADA).
29. During the interactive process, workers with disabilities propose accommodations
and employers either accept workers' proposals or offer alternatives. And, as its descriptive
title suggests, the interactive process contemplates the employer and the worker exchanging
information and possible solutions in a collaborative effort to find the least costly, effective
accommodations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(o)(3) (2006) (illustrating the procedures of an
interactive process); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 34 (1989) ("A problem-solving approach
should be used to identify the particular tasks or aspects of the work environment that limit
performance and to identify possible accommodations .... [E]mployers first will consult
with and involve the individual with a disability in deciding on the appropriate
accommodation."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 65 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303 (echoing the Senate Report). Courts disagree about whether a failure to
engage in the interactive process is a violation of the ADA. Compare Rehling v. City of
Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1015-1016 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employer's failure to
engage in the interactive process is not sufficient to show that the employer violated the
ADA's accommodation mandate) with Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, 212 F.3d 638,
648 n.12 (1st Cir. 2000) (considering that an employer's failure to engage in the interactive
process may be evidence of a violation of the ADA). Even if it is not, the ADA created a
significant incentive for employers to engage in the interactive process by exempting from
compensatory and punitive damages. those employers that demonstrate "[a] good faith
effort[], in consultation with the person with the disability ...to identify and make a
reasonable accommodation ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2000). Similarly, the ADA
urges the parties to use alternative disputes resolution systems, like mediation, to assist their
negotiations over accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2000) ("Where appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including
settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter") (emphasis added);
see also H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 499-500 (further discussing Congress' encouragement of voluntary alternative dispute
resolution in ADA cases).
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how the ADA's accommodation mandate improves efficiency in the
workplace. At the same time, this Article does not attempt to define what
is a "reasonable accommodation" or "undue hardship" under the ADA. As
explained more fully below, an employer's obligation to provide
accommodations does not depend upon proof that he or she will benefit, or
that the accommodation will produce a net benefit after taking all effects on
all parties into account.3°
In reality, the rational choice and discriminatory choice views address
different labor markets. Proponents of the rational choice position focus on
the external labor market-that is, a market free of the competitive barriers
that define the internal labor market. In a properly functioning external
labor market, employers and job applicants buy and sell labor according to
terms largely set by supply and demand.31  By contrast, the empirical
studies supporting the discriminatory choice position focus principally on
incumbent employees.32 The flaw in the rational choice argument is the
assumption that competitive labor markets are the ordinary case.33 This
Article's econo-legal analysis considers incumbent employees in non-
competitive internal labor markets.
Several data points suggest that accommodation issues frequently
arise in internal labor markets. A large majority of the ADA charges filed
with the EEOC relate to incumbent employees, not job applicants.34 In
30. Even jurists identified with the law and economics movement do not endorse that
approach. See Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)
(delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Posner stated: "It would not follow that.., an
accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit
however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the
benefit."); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)
(interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, Judge Calabresi held, "an accommodation is reasonable
only if its costs are not clearly disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce.").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 38-39 (discussing the request for accommodation
in the internal and the external labor market).
32. See, e.g., Blanck et al., Workplace Accommodations, supra note 18 (explaining that
roughly 75% of the accommodations being discussed with survey respondents were to be
provided to incumbent employees) (manuscript at 6, on file with author).
33. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (citing evidence that many scholars
believe that accommodations issues are resolved in a competitive labor market).
34. See Stewart Schwab et al., Comparison of Employment Disability Discrimination
Claims with Other Statutes Across U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission and Fair
Employment Practice Agencies Nationally, in THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT:
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Ashley Stein & Samuel Estreicher eds., forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with authors) (assuming that any charge relating to
"discharge," "terms and conditions," and "harassment" necessarily comes from an
incumbent employee, and all "reasonable accommodation" and "hiring" charges come from
job applicants, nearly 70% of charges relate to incumbent employees. However, assuming
the more likely but still very conservative result that half of "reasonable accommodation"
charges come from incumbent employees, then roughly 80% of charges relate to incumbent
employees).
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2004, 1.3 million incumbent employees in the private sector suffered
workplace illnesses or injuries requiring recuperation away from work
beyond the day of the incident.35 A survey of Americans between the ages
of 51 and 61 in the 1992 Health and Retirement Study found that 36% of
people in that age range with work-limiting impairments acquired those
impairments because of an accident, injury, or illness at work. Thirty-
seven percent (37%) of Social Security Disability Insurance beneficiaries in
the same age group were disabled because of an accident, injury, or illness
at work.36 Even these surveys do not take into account employees whose
disabilities were present, but hidden, when they were originally 
hired.37
The rational choice story of the external labor market, even if it is accurate,
is only one part of a much larger story about accommodations and the
employment of workers with disabilities. This Article joins the debate to
contribute another important chapter to that larger story.
Part II begins by describing internal labor market theory and how
internal labor markets benefit both employees and employers outside the
context of a discussion over disability accommodations. It also briefly
addresses the controversy over the continuing vitality of internal labor
markets. Then, looking at three different scenarios in which incumbent
employees might request accommodations, Part II will go on to describe
how employees' disabilities can affect the efficiencies of the internal labor
market. It will also explain how an accommodation can restore an efficient
employment relationship and, in some circumstances, yield additional
productivity benefits for the employer. Part III considers other benefits an
employer derives from accommodating an employee with a disability. That
Part identifies costs which an accommodation allows the employer to
avoid-that is, the "opportunity benefits" of providing an accommodation.
Adding up all of the costs and benefits of an accommodation, the article
concludes that employers can, and often will, derive economic benefits
from providing accommodations to their incumbent employees with
disabilities. This conclusion is consistent with the empirical studies of
accommodations' costs and benefits discussed above.
II. LABOR MARKETS, IMPAIRMENTS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS
From the employer's perspective, the perspective with which this
Article is concerned, an accommodation produces a net benefit if the
35. See ISHITA SENGUPTA ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., WORKERS' COMPENSATION
2006: BENEFITS, COVERAGE, AND COSTS 30 (2004).
36. See Robert T. Reville & Robert F. Schoeni, The Fraction of Disability Caused at
Work, 65 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 31, 31 (2003-04).
37. See infra Part II.D (discussing the possible effects of hidden disabilities on the
internal labor market relationship).
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productivity increase resulting from the accommodation plus any costs
avoided as a result of providing the accommodation exceeds the cost of the
accommodation. The next Part analyzes the avoidability of costs by
examining accommodation costs and how accommodations can increase
productivity. It offers a general and theoretical model for assessing the
economic benefits of workplace accommodations. Of course, different
inputs will produce different results. Therefore, it is not possible to declare
categorically that accommodating every employee with a disability will
benefit each employer. Rather, this Part concludes only that there are many
circumstances in which accommodating an employee with a disability can
benefit her employer. The model presented in this Part describes those
circumstances and provides a framework for assessing the costs and
benefits of accommodations.
A. Internal Labor Markets and External Labor Markets
The job applicant and the incumbent employee are situated differently.
As a result, requests for accommodations may arise in either of two labor
markets. An employer's incumbent employee may request an
accommodation in the "internal labor market" or a job applicant may
request an accommodation in the "external labor market."3 The external
labor market, where employers and job applicants bargain over the terms
and conditions of employment, is a competitive market. Job applicants are
generally mobile, since they offer general skills that may benefit many
employers. As a result, employers can choose from among many fungible
job applicants. Similarly, job applicants can choose from among many
fungible employers. Neither party has invested in the relationship before a
job has been offered and an acceptance rendered, so there are few
transaction costs associated with the choice of one employer or one worker.
As a result, economists expect the external labor market to be competitive
and for supply and demand to set the terms and conditions of
employment.39
This Article is not principally concerned with the external labor
market. Instead, it focuses on incumbent employees who bargain with their
38. The ADA's protections extend to job applicants. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)
("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment") (emphasis added); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000) (requiring reasonable accommodations for applicants as well as
employees).
39. See Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of
Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting,
Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1349, 1353 (1988).
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employers in the "internal labor market., 40  The internal labor market is
characterized by barriers to competition that may have several sources.
The human capital theory of the internal labor market identifies firm-
specific skills and knowledge as the principal barriers to competition.
4'
Incumbent employees acquire firm-specific skills and knowledge either
through experience, formal training, or relationships developed in the
workplace. 42  These firm-specific skills and knowledge make incumbent
employees more productive than otherwise qualified workers who could be
hired from the external labor market. 43  They also make the incumbent
employees more productive with their current employer than they would be
working for another employer. As a result, both parties are willing to
invest in the employee's acquisition of firm-specific skills and knowledge
since they will share the productivity dividends of those skills and
knowledge. The employer yields greater profits generated by the
employee's increased productivity. The employee benefits because her
greater productivity allows her aggregate wages (i.e., career compensation)
with her current employer to exceed the compensation that any other
employer could provide.44
Finn-specific skills and knowledge differ from general skills and
knowledge. General skills and knowledge would benefit any employer.
Like firm-specific skills and knowledge, they increase an employee's
40. See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR
EcoNoMIcs: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 (8th ed. 2003) (defining "internal labor
market").
41. See Oliver E. Williamson et al., Understanding the Employment Relation: The
Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange, 6 BELL J. ECON. 250, 253 (1975); see also EHRENBERG
& SMITH, supra note 40, at 159 ("Firms most likely to decide that the benefits of using an
internal labor market outweigh the costs are those whose upper-level workers must have a
lot of firm-specific knowledge and training that can best be attained by on-the-job learning
over the years."). For an early definition of "human capital theory," the leading version of
internal labor market theory, see Gary Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical
Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9, 9 (1962) and Walter Oi, Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor, 70 J.
POL. ECON. 538 (1962).
42. See Williamson et al., supra note 41, at 253-257; Becker, supra note 41, at 11-18.
43. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 153-156; Becker, supra note 41, at 11-
20; Williamson et al., supra note 41, at 253.
44. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8, 15 (1993) ("Because the parties share the costs and
benefits of training throughout the employee's work life, both parties want to continue the
relationship. The employer pays employees less than their full value later in their career.
This protects employees from discharge because a discharge would harm the employer as
well. The late-career wage exceeds, however, the outside wage the employee could receive,
thereby discouraging the employee from quitting."). Empirical evidence supports the view
that wages in internal labor markets are set according to different standards than those
typically considered relevant to the external labor market. See, e.g., George Baker & Bengt
Holmstrom, Internal Labor Markets: Too Many Theories, Too Few Facts, 85 AM. ECON.
REv. 255, 258-59 (1995).
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productivity, but employers face a significant risk if they invest in their
employees' general skills. Employees may quit and sell their general skills
and knowledge to other employers in the external labor market. No
employer wants to pay for skills and knowledge that will generate
productivity returns for a competitor. 45 Thus, employers may be willing to
forego the productivity benefits generated from investing in greater general
skills and knowledge in order to avoid the risk of losing their investment.
The job-match theory posits that a different set of competitive barriers
define the internal labor market. According to this theory, an employer
systematically underpays its employee in the early stages of her career
because the employer sets the entry-level wage with inadequate
information about the employee's productivity in the job. As the employer
learns more about the employee's productivity over time, the employer
becomes better able to pay higher wages to employees who are well-
matched to their jobs and, therefore, highly productive. Longer job tenure
exposes better information to the employer. As a result, the employer
becomes better able, over time, to pay the employee commensurate with
her productivity and to compensate her for earlier underpayments. 6 In
addition, having better information about an employee's capabilities allows
the employer to match the employee with her "optimal assignment"-that
is, the job in which the employee will be most productive 7 In turn, the
employee's higher productivity permits the employer to pay the employee
higher wages. Better matched workers are more productive and tend to
remain with their firms longer, in part because they earn high wages that
other employers will not match.4 ' All of this results in a virtuous cycle,
where the incumbent employee is more valuable to the employer than
workers from the external labor market and, in turn, the employer
remunerates the employee more richly than other employers would.
The "supervision" or "efficiency wage" theory of the internal labor
market, on the other hand, suggests that employers defer wage payments-
that is, they increase employees' wages as the employees' tenure
45. See Schwab, supra note 44, at 13 n. 18.
46. See Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1246,
1246-47 (1979) (setting forth the job match theory); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and
the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972, 974 (1979) [hereinafter Job Matching]
(discussing how the model implies that the average wage of the cohort increases with
tenure).
47. See Jovanovic, Job Matching, supra note 46, at 974 (assuming that "imperfect
in'ormation exists on both sides of the market about the exact location of one's optimal
assignment. Following an initial assignment, new information becomes available, and
reassignment becomes optimal in certain cases").
48. See Jacob Mincer & Boyan Jovanovic, Labor Mobility and Wages, in STUDIES IN
LABOR MARKETS 21, 26-27 (Sherwin Rosen, ed. 1981); Jovanovich, Job Matching, supra
note 46, at 974.
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increases-as a means of encouraging employees to sustain their
productivity early in their careers. Although higher wages do not reward
incumbent employees directly for their present productivity, incumbent
employees work harder in the near term to earn their reward in the long
term. In other words, higher wages in the later stages of employees'
careers are a reward for employees' earlier diligence.4
9 Thus, incumbent
employees' expectations based on employers' implicit (or perhaps explicit)
promises make the employees more productive than workers from the
external labor market.
The relationship between wages, firm tenure, productivity in the
internal labor market, and productivity and wages in the external labor
market has been depicted by the following graph:5"
49. See Erling Barth, Firm-Specific Seniority and Wages, 15 J. LAB. ECON. 495, 496
(1997) (discussing whether deferring worker wages increases productivity); see also Robert
M. Hutchens, Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade, 3 J. EcON. PERSP.
49, 60-61 (1989) (discussing delayed compensation and the "supervision" theory); see
generally Edward P. Lazear, Agency, Earnings Profiles, Productivity, and Hours
Restrictions, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 606, 606 (1981) (advocating paying workers less than their
value of marginal product (VMP) when they are young and paying them more than their
VMP when they are old).
50. See, e.g., Wachter & Cohen, supra note 39, at 1362-63 fig. 1 (offering this graph to
depict the internal labor market relationship). This graph best describes the internal labor
market relationships posited by human capital theory and job match theory. Both of these
theories assume a relationship between productivity rising with tenure and wages rising with
tenure. Supervision theory disconnects the employee's productivity from her wages;
therefore, a graphical representation of this theory would look different. The wage curve
would be roughly similar to the wage curve found in the graph below. In supervision
theory's purest form, the employee's productivity curve would be close to horizontal, with a
slow, steady declining slope like that of the opportunity wage curve.
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In this graph, W (wage) represents all forms of compensation paid by
the employer to its employee; MP (marginal productivity) represents the
employee's productivity with her current employer; and OW (opportunity
wage) represents the worker's wage in the external labor market-that is,
the wage the worker would earn from the next best employer. Because the
external labor market is competitive, the opportunity wage also tracks the
worker's productivity with the next best employer. Tenure A is the point at
which the worker enters the internal labor market. Tenure F represents the
employee's retirement from her career with the employer.
The employee invests in her relationship with the employer from
Tenure A to Tenure D. This investment results from the employee
accepting a wage from her employer that is lower than her opportunity
wage. After Tenure D until Tenure F the employee earns dividends
because her wage exceeds her opportunity wage. As long as the difference
between the present value of the employee's wage and the present value of
her opportunity wage after Tenure D (i.e., PV(WDF - OWDF)) exceeds the
difference between the present value of the opportunity wage and the
present value of the wage prior to Tenure D (i.e., PV(OWA-D - WA-D)), the
employee will reap a net dividend from her sunk investments (i.e., Dee =
PV(WD-F - OWD-F) - PV(OWAD - WA-D)). If this net dividend is greater
than zero (i.e., Dee > 0), then the employee benefits from her relationship
with her employer. Further, since the employee earns dividends until
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retirement at Tenure F, the employee has an incentive to remain in the
relationship with her employer as long as possible, all other things being
equal.
The employer invests between Tenure A and Tenure B and again
between Tenure E and Tenure F. During these periods, the employee's
wage exceeds her productivity. The employer earns dividends between
Tenure B and Tenure E when the employee's productivity, higher because
of her implicit contract with the employer, exceeds her actual wage. Once
again, as long as the difference between the present value of the
employee's productivity and the present value of the employee's actual
wage from Tenure B to Tenure E (i.e., PV(MPB-E - WB-E)) exceeds the
difference between the present value of the wage and the present value of
the productivity from Tenure A to Tenure B and from Tenure E to Tenure
F (i.e., PV(WA.B - MPA-B) + PV(WE-F - MPE-F)), the employer will reap a
net dividend from its investments (i.e., Der = PV(MPB-E - WB-E) - [PV(WA-B
- MPA-B) + PV(WE-F - MPE-F)]. If the net dividend is greater than zero (i.e.,
Der > 0), then the employer benefits from the relationship with the
employee in the internal labor market.5'
Regardless of whether the barrier to competition is created by the
firm-specific skills and knowledge of incumbent employees (human capital
theory), the effects of more accurate job matching on productivity (job
match theory), or the employer's productivity incentive system
(supervision theory), the internal labor market creates a bilateral monopoly.
Under ordinary circumstances, the parties will try to continue their
relationship because each party reaps dividends that are not available
elsewhere and each party sinks investments into the relationship which they
do not want to forfeit. Thus, the employer will be disinclined to discharge
the employee. The employer will also avoid behaviors that might cause the
employee to quit. Similarly, the employee will be disinclined to quit
because no other employer would compensate her at a level equal to that
paid by her current employer.5 2 In sum, the benefits derived by the parties
from continuing their relationship create incentives for a long-term
relationship. The boundary between the external labor market and the
51. This model is subject to caveats. Perhaps most importantly, employers have great
difficulty isolating an individual worker's productivity or measuring it with the precision
suggested by this graph. One important cause of this measurement problem is that
employees rarely work in isolation, but measuring an individual's contribution to a group's
product may not be possible. Accordingly, discussions of productivity should usually be
preceded by a warning that most productivity measures are rough estimates, at best. See
Stein, supra note 21, at 139-42.
52. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 132-161, 332-35; see also Schwab,
supra note 44, at 15 (showing that wages differing from market rates can encourage
continuing working relationship).
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internal labor market is the point at which there are sunk investments and
prospective dividends which the parties do not want to lose.
Yet, there is no formal, explicit, legally enforceable contract codifying
this arrangement. Implicit agreements broadly set the terms for a long-term
employment relationship but do not mandate specific behaviors throughout
the life of the agreement.53 The type of detailed, long-term, written
contract that would be needed to produce this result is impractical and
uncommon. Among other reasons, the transaction costs associated with
negotiating and enforcing a formal, detailed, complex, and contingent
contract would be prohibitive.54  Furthermore, specific agreements
regarding future behaviors (i.e., the amount of work expected from the
employee, the amount of pay required of the employer) subject the parties
to the risks associated with changing circumstances. The parties' inability
to predict every contingency that might arise over the life of their
employment relationship-that is, "bounded rationality"-requires
preserving flexibility to take into account changing circumstances. 5 Less
specificity and greater flexibility, however, make the agreement difficult to
enforce at law.5 6 As a result, after the worker is hired, the parties engage in
rolling renegotiations and reinterpretations of their relationship to re-
calibrate the distribution of investments and dividends.57
Without a legal enforcement mechanism, a danger arises that one
party will engage in "strategic" or "opportunistic" behavior which
expropriates some of the other party's benefits or shifts the costs onto the
other party.58 For example, an employer may be tempted to engage in
strategic behavior between Tenure E and Tenure F. The employer has
already reaped all of its dividends, but the incumbent employee awaits a
portion of her dividend because the employer is expected to pay the
53. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 132-161, 332-35; see also Schwab,
supra note 44, at 15.
54. See Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor
Markets, in THE ECONOMICS OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 86, 97 (Daniel J.B.
Mitchell & Mahmood A. Zaidi eds., 1990) ("If the parties inside the firm attempt to
maximize the coalition's surplus, they must obviously attempt to reduce transaction costs as
much as possible (or, more accurately, as much as it is efficient to do so). Since negotiating,
writing, and enforcing contracts often incur high transaction costs, complex state-contingent
contracts might not be joint profit maximizing.").
55. Oliver D. Hart, Optimal Labour Contracts Under Asymmetric Information: An
Introduction, 50 REV. ECON. STUD. 3, 23 (1983) (discussing the role of bounded rationality
in contracting).
56. Seth D. Harris, Coase's Paradox and the Inefficiency of Permanent Strike
Replacements, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1185, 1212 (2002).
57. Hart, supra note 55, at 23 ("In reality, there exist few contracts between firms and
workers containing the amount of detail which ... [may be] appropriate .... [C]ontracts
tend to be in force for limited periods of time, and are then renegotiated.").
58. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 39, at 1359-60 (discussing potential for
opportunistic behavior).
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employee a wage in excess of her productivity during this phase of her
tenure. So, the employer might fire the employee. The discharge allows
the employer to avoid paying wages that will exceed the employee's
productivity. The employer thereby "usurp[s] some of the employee's
dividend."5 9 On the other hand, the employee might be tempted to engage
in strategic behavior during the period between Tenure B and Tenure E
when the employee's productivity exceeds her wage. If the employee
"shirks" during this period, and thereby reduces her productivity, she
usurps some of the employer's dividend and transforms it into leisure time
for herself. Further, the employer must pay the costs of monitoring the
employee's work more closely to minimize her shirking and, perhaps, risk
disciplining the employee and undermining their relationship further.6'
Strategic behavior may benefit the party that engages in it, but it
threatens the efficiencies made possible by the internal labor market. It
may also have effects beyond the instant parties which, in turn, deprive the
party engaging in the strategic behavior of its benefits. For example, an
employer's strategic behavior with respect to one worker might cause other
incumbent employees to doubt the reliability of their relationship with the
employer. 61 These co-workers might shirk, quit, or demand a costly and
specific written agreement that assures them their expected dividends.
These costs may exceed the appropriated dividends.62  Workers in the
external labor market might also learn of the employer's reputation and shy
away from entering into an agreement with the employer or demand
additional guarantees.63
It would be disingenuous, at least, to end this general discussion of
internal labor market theory without acknowledging that there has been a
substantial debate over whether any internal labor markets remain in the
American economy and, therefore, whether internal labor market theory
remains relevant. Katherine Stone, Peter Cappelli, and Paul Osterman,
among others, have described a series of shocks to the American economy
59. Harris, supra note 56, at 1208. Other scholars have offered a similar analysis to
argue that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, by deterring this kind of employer
opportunism, defends the internal labor market's efficiencies. See, e.g., Gary Minda,
Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension
Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 528-30 (1997) (arguing that older
employees subject to opportunistic behavior are protected by the ADEA); Schwab, supra
note 44, at 15-20.
60. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 39, at 1358.
61. See Harris, supra note 56, at 1208 (demonstrating that opportunism decreases the
total value of the benefit).
62. See Wachter & Cohen, supra note 39, at 1364.
63. See George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers: The
Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 4 3 RD ANNUAL
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 118 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990) (stating that workers
avoid investment in a firm exhibiting opportunistic behavior in the past).
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during the 1980s and 1990s wrought by globalization, technological
developments, deregulation, declining union density rates, and other
factors. These scholars have argued that these shocks substantially
weakened internal labor markets and reduced their relevance.64 Other
scholars, most notably Sanford Jacoby, acknowledge these economic
shocks to the American economy and their importance, but argue that their
effects on internal labor markets have been overstated and that they signal
little more than evolutionary change.65
This debate is too substantial and important to resolve in a few brief
paragraphs. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that no scholar has argued that
internal labor markets have entirely disappeared from the American
economy. The better argument is that internal labor markets have survived
but with some modifications that do not match the traditional expectations
of how they will operate. Michael Piore, whose seminal work with Peter
Doeringer defined internal labor markets 66 for a generation of labor
economists and scholars in law, industrial relations, management, human
resources, and organizational theory, explained the state of the debate in
this way:
The world into which we are moving is a [sic] not a world in
which the pricing and allocation of labor will be wholly governed
by market forces, unmediated by administrative rules and social
64. See, e.g., PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK (1999) (showing that long-
term career arrangements have given way to flexibility during the past twenty years); PAUL
OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY (1999) (showing American transformation into a flexible
workforce); KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (describing change in the twentieth
century employment market from a focus on long-term employment to flexibility); Peter
Cappelli, Career Jobs Are Dead, 42 CAL. MGMT. REV. 146 (1999) (explaining the declining
internal labor markets and rising external markets in recent years). See generally PAUL
OSTERMAN ET AL., WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET
(2001) (taking a more ambiguous position on the viability of internal labor markets, likely
reflecting the book's authorship by committee).
65. See SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS, AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY (rev. ed. 2004) (arguing that the
current institutional labor market has its roots in the New Deal); Sanford M. Jacoby, Melting
into Air? Downsizing, Job Stability, and the Future of Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1195
(2000) (arguing that the "welfare capitalist" state remains in place despite recent economic
changes); Sanford M. Jacoby, Are Career Jobs Headed for Extinction?, 42 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 123 (1999) (responding to arguments that long-term employment no longer exists); see
also Gary Charness & David I. Levine, Changes in the Employment Contract? Evidence
from a Quasi-Experiment, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 391 (2002) (finding that employee
attitudes have not shifted in a manner that is consistent with a decline in internal labor
markets); Erica L. Groshen & David I. Levine, The Rise and Decline (?) of U.S. Internal
Labor Markets (July 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding no
evidence of decline in internal labor markets).
66. See PETER B. DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND
MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1971).
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customs. We will, in other words, continue to have internal labor
markets in the broad sense of the term. But the particular forms
these internal labor markets will take are extremely varied. No
single form will be dominant in the way in which the
bureaucratic organization was dominant earlier in the post-war
period.67
Recent data tend to support Piore's conclusion. Stone and other
scholars who argued that the internal labor market weakened have relied
heavily on the decline in men's job tenure rates as evidence of a purported
decline in internal labor markets. Like Acemoglu & Angrist and DeLeire,6 8
these scholars looked at data within a time horizon that is too narrow.
6 9
Data that became available after their studies were published strongly
suggest a return to relative stability in job tenure rates for men and stability
for women after a long-term increase.70 The purported rise of alternative
work arrangements has also been an important reference point in the debate
over internal labor markets, but the percentage of the American workforce
engaged in alternative work arrangements has been generally stable since
the Bureau of Labor Statistics began collecting these data.7 In sum,
despite the scholarly debate, there is a great deal of evidence that internal
labor markets and, therefore, internal labor market theory remain relevant
67. Michael J. Piore, Thirty Years Later: Internal Labor Markets, Flexibility and the
New Economy, 6 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 271, 273 (2002).
68. See supra note 7 (criticizing the studies of Acemoglu & Angrist and DeLeire and
finding a causal relationship between the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the declining employment rate of working-age people with disabilities).
69. See supra note 7.
70. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE 1. MEDIAN YEARS OF TENURE WITH
CURRENT EMPLOYER FOR EMPLOYED WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS BY AGE AND SEX,
SELECTED YEARS, 1996-2006, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.t0I.htm, (last visited
Jan. 21, 2007); see also Ann Huff Stevens, The More Things Change, The More They Stay
The Same: Trends in Long-Term Employment in the United States, 1969-2002 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11878, 2005) available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1878 (finding stability in the prevalence of men's long-term
employment relationships during the period studied); William P. Bridges, Age and the
Labor Market: Trends in Employment Security and Employment Institutions, in
SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES, 319, 320-326
(Ivar Berg & Arne L. Kalleberg eds., 2001) (explaining that declining job tenure rates for
older workers does not signal the demise of internal labor markets).
71. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, FEBRUARY 2005,
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nrO.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007) (disclosing
that, apart from a small increase in the percentage of workers who are "independent
contractors," there has been no change in other types of "alternative work arrangements"
since 2001); see also Arne L. Kalleberg, Evolving Employment Relations in the United
States, in SOURCEBOOK OF LABOR MARKETS: EVOLVING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES 187,
191-195 (Ivar Berg & Arne L. Kalleberg eds., 2001).
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in the American economy and for American workers. This Article's
argument proceeds on those grounds.
B. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market: The After-
Hiring Impairment
The preceding section described the general context-the internal
labor market relationship-in which an incumbent employee may request
an accommodation. An accommodation request may arise in any one of
three scenarios in the internal labor market. In the first scenario, the
employee develops a physical or mental impairment after being hired
which interacts with her current job to limit the employee's productivity
(i.e., an "after-hiring impairment").7 2 For example, an industrial accident
might have caused the employee to suffer a permanent partial impairment
that must be accommodated for her to perform her job.73 This section will
consider after-hiring impairments.
The second scenario actually involves two different factual situations
which, for the purposes of this analysis, can be considered together. An
incumbent employee may be promoted or transferred out of one job for
which she did not need an accommodation into a differently structured,
second job that she cannot perform without an accommodation (i.e.,
"promotion or transfer"). For example, an employee with a bad back might
be transferred from a sedentary job in an airline's mail room to a cargo-
moving job requiring heavy lifting.7 4  Alternatively, an incumbent
employee's job may be modified to include new and different functions
(i.e., "job redesign"). For example, an employee with carpal tunnel
syndrome and tendinitis in her arms and shoulders might be newly required
to hold blocks of wood for several hours at shoulder-level.7 5 The next
section will consider promotions, transfers, and job redesigns.
A third scenario would involve an employee with an unobservable or
"hidden" impairment that interacts with her current job to reduce her
72. Going forward, I will adhere more closely to the ADA's lexicon and refer to the
employee's "impairment" rather than the employee's "disability." The ADA defines
"disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual .... 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). Thus, the
employee has an impairment, while the interaction of the impairment and the employee's
environment creates a "disability." See Seth D. Harris, Introduction: Understanding the
Context for the "Coelho Challenge ", 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 711, 721 (2004).
73. See, e.g., Allen v. Ga. Power Co., 980 F. Supp. 470,472 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Plaintiff
injured his back when he and a co-worker attempted to lift cross-ties onto a truck. ...
Subsequently, [he] experienced leg pain, in addition to the back pain, and was not able to
perform numerous job tasks that [employees at the plant] were required to perform.").
74. See, e.g., U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 394 (2002) (5-4 decision).
75. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187-189 (2002).
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productivity or performance to a level lower than what the employer
expected when the employee was hired. For example, an employee may
have an undisclosed hearing limitation which makes him unable to
distinguish different alarm signals, a function that is critical to his job.
7 6
Section D will consider hidden impairments.
Before proceeding to a discussion of these scenarios, however, some
definition of "benefit" is needed to assess this Article's claim that
employers can "benefit" from providing accommodations to its employees
with disabilities. I will use two measures. First, the employer may be
better off accommodating the employee than continuing the relationship
with that employee absent an accommodation. In other words, the
employer is better off with the accommodation than without it. Second, the
employer may be better off accommodating the employee than if the
employee did not have an impairment; that is, the employer may be better
off with the accommodation and the impairment than without the
impairment.77 This Article will argue that accommodating incumbent
employees with impairments can benefit employers according to both of
these measures, although satisfying the first measure will prove easier than
satisfying the second.
1. Isolating the After-Hiring Impairment's Effects
The first scenario arises when an incumbent employee suffers an
injury or otherwise develops a physical or mental impairment for which the
employee needs accommodation to perform her current job at the expected
level of productivity." I will assume, as a preliminary matter, that the
76. See e.g., Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp. of Ind., 89 F.3d 342, 343 (7th Cir. 1996)
(describing plaintiff, who was "seriously hard of hearing" and accepted a job as a nurse in
the hemodialysis unit at Methodist Hospital. Due to his hearing impairment, he could not
hear and distinguish between the different alarms from the dialysis machines.).
77. I acknowledge a moral hazard associated with this argument-that is, it suggests a
risk that employers would benefit from inflicting some kind of harm on their employees,
resulting in an impairment. This risk is actually quite small, if it exists at all. First, this
article does not argue that every employer will benefit from accommodating every
impairment; thus, a baseball-bat wielding employer would bear the risk of deriving no
benefit or suffering a loss in some cases. Second, this article argues that employers benefit
from accommodating impairments through cooperation with their employees with
impairments. Presumably, an employee would be less willing to cooperate with an
employer who intentionally caused her harm. Finally, and most obviously, employers
intentionally inflicting harm on their employees subject themselves to various kinds of civil
and criminal liability.
78. I do not mean to suggest that people with disabilities are inherently less productive
than people without disabilities. They are not. See Stein, supra note 21, at 130-34. Rather,
the factual predicate for this analysis is that an employee with an impairment requests an
accommodation that affects her productivity by adapting her work environment to her
impairment.
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accommodation would allow the employee's productivity to return to its
pre-impairment level and increase as expected over time.79 I will also
assume that the accommodation entails some cost, at least in the first
instance. 80  Absent accommodation, and assuming no change in the
employee's compensation in the first instance,81 it is possible to assess the
impairment's effects on the employee's and the employer's dividends and
investments.
On Graph #1, the incumbent employee's productivity with her current
employer is illustrated by the marginal productivity curve (MP). The
employee's productivity with the next best employer is depicted by the
opportunity wage curve (OW). When the impairment occurs, both the MP
curve and the OW curve will shift down because the impairment interacts
with the employee's job in a manner that reduces the employee's
productivity.82 The consequences of the after-hiring impairment are
depicted in the following two graphs. In each graph, the solid lines
represent the productivity curves that would have been observed absent the
impairment (MP, OW), while the dotted lines depict the productivity
curves observed with the impairment (MPl (B), OWI(B)).
79. This result is suggested by the ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a
disability." See supra note 12 (giving the ADA's definition of "qualified individual with a
disability"). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that employees with disabilities who have been
accommodated can perform at the level expected of an unimpaired worker. Some
accommodations may not produce this result. Nonetheless, making this assumption allows
for the creation of a model which can take into account circumstances that do not fit this
assumption.
80. As noted above, many accommodations impose no new costs on employers. In
those cases, the employer is more likely to derive a net benefit and, at worst, will suffer no
loss from providing the accommodation.
81. See infra Part II.C (discussing transfers, promotions and job-redesigns).
82. The analysis in this section assumes that the impairment's productivity effects are
the same in the internal and external labor markets. Once again, I do not mean to suggest
that this assumption is always true; however, this model can be easily modified to relax this
assumption and predict the effects there from. See generally J.Hoalt H. Verkerke, Is the
ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REv. 903, 910-15 (2003) (discussing how workers with
impairments may find better and more productive matches in different jobs if the
impairment is observable). Also, this discussion assumes that the employee's opportunity
wage is a direct function of her productivity. The opportunity wage may be disconnected
from and lower than the employee's actual productivity because of market failures,
including discrimination. Finally, the depiction of the impairment's effects on the
employee's productivity in all of the graphs in this paper assumes that the employee's
condition does not change over time. Of course, this assumption will not hold true for
people with multiple sclerosis and other degenerative conditions. In these circumstances,
the gap between the unadjusted MP and OW curves and the adjusted MP and OW curves
would grow over time.
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On Graph #2, the impairment occurs at Tenure D. One very important
effect of the impairment is that the employee's dividend increases. The
relationship between the employee's wage and her opportunity wage
remains unchanged from Tenure A to Tenure D, so the employee does not
make any larger investment as a consequence of the impairment. Yet, the
employee reaps a larger dividend from Tenure D to Tenure F because the
wage remains unchanged while the opportunity wage is lower as a result of
the impairment. A larger dividend results because the employee's actual
wage exceeds her opportunity wage by a larger amount during this period
than it would have absent the impairment.
The incumbent employee does not realize this increased dividend.
She receives no greater compensation, for example. Instead, the larger
dividend is an additional competitive barrier in the internal labor market
that more tightly binds the employee to the employer. Moving from an
internal labor market to the external labor market ordinarily causes a
worker without a disability to suffer a loss in career compensation. 83 The
employee with an after-hiring impairment would suffer an even greater
wage loss if she were required to seek alternative employment in the
83. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (explaining that the internal labor market
provides above-market compensation which encourages continuity in the employer-
employee relationship).
INTERNAL LABOR MARKET
external labor market. The additional loss would be equal to the value of
the productivity lost as a consequence of the impairment. The incumbent
employee's relationship with the employer, therefore, becomes far more
valuable to the employee.
On Graph #2, the impairment causes the employer to reap smaller
dividends than expected from its relationship with this employee. The
employer makes the same level of investment in the employee between
Tenure A and Tenure B and reaps the same dividend between Tenure B and
Tenure D because the employee's wage and marginal productivity have not
changed during periods preceding the impairment. The employer reaps a
smaller dividend after Tenure D than it would have received absent the
impairment because of the employee's lower level of productivity. Also,
the dividend period no longer extends to Tenure E. As a result of the shift
in the marginal productivity curve, the employer's dividend period ends at
Tenure D'. For the same reasons, the employer makes a larger investment
between Tenure D' and Tenure F. This larger investment further discounts
the employer's net dividend. As a result, the employer has a weaker
economic rationale for sustaining a relationship with the incumbent
employee with an impairment. At best, the employer will reap some
dividends from its larger investments. At worst, the employer's increased
investments will exceed the smaller dividends and the employer will suffer
a loss. Thus, the relationship may remain profitable for the employer after
the impairment, but this result is less likely than it would have been absent
the impairment.
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In Graph #3, with the impairment occurring at Tenure B, the
employer's net dividends are even smaller. The employer receives a
smaller dividend-that is, marginal productivity in excess of wage-for a
shorter period of time (i.e., Tenure B' to Tenure D' rather than Tenure B to
Tenure E). The employer also makes the same larger investment between
Tenure D' and Tenure F as was depicted in Graph #2. Only the investment
between Tenure A and Tenure B remains unaffected because the
employee's marginal productivity does not change during this period. As a
result, the employer's dividend is smaller when the impairment occurs at
Tenure B than when it occurs at Tenure D. With the impairment occurring
earlier in the employee's career, all other things being equal, after the
impairment it becomes even less likely that the employer will benefit from
a long-term relationship with the employee.
If the impairment occurs at Tenure B, the effect on .the employee's
opportunity wage means that the employee makes a smaller investment for
a shorter period of time (i.e., the investment period begins at Tenure A, but
ends at Tenure C' rather than Tenure D). The employee also reaps a larger
dividend, and the dividend period begins sooner and has a longer duration.
This period begins at Tenure C', rather than Tenure D, and lasts until
Tenure F.84 No change occurs between Tenure A and Tenure B. As a
84. There remains a short period at and after Tenure B when the employee's post-
impairment opportunity wage exceeds her actual wage. Seeking employment in the external
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result, the employee reaps a dividend that is larger by the amount of the
change in her opportunity wage. The employee's total dividend is also
greater than it would have been with a later-occurring impairment because
the aggregate decrease in the opportunity wage is greater. Thus, an earlier
impairment-that is, Tenure B rather than Tenure D-further increases the
employee's dividend. The effect of this larger dividend is to bind the
employee with an after-hiring impairment even more tightly to the
employer's internal labor market.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the effects of an after-hiring
impairment on the economic relationship between the employer and the
incumbent employee vary according to the timing of the impairment. But
timing does not change the conclusion that the impairment causes the
employer's dividend to shrink and the employee's dividend to grow. These
are the background conditions for determining whether employers can
benefit from accommodating workers with after-hiring impairments. The
next sub-section introduces an accommodation into the equation.
2. Assessing the Accommodation's Costs and Benefits
Both parties' dividends are derived by considering the relationship
between the employee's wage and the employee's productivity; however,
the wage is compared to different productivity measures to yield these
dividends. The employer compares the wage to the employee's
productivity. The employee compares the wage to her opportunity wage.
Also, the effective wage-the value which each party assigns to the
wage-may differ for the employee and the employer. This section will
explain how these differences create the opportunity for an accommodation
to produce a Pareto superior result. Disabilities accommodations are not
necessarily a zero-sum game and, as a result, they may benefit the
employers that provide them.
Accommodation costs have been treated as wage increases because
they purportedly increase the employer's cost of employing the worker
with a disability (i.e., the "effective wage").85 But care must be taken
labor market at this point may benefit the employee in the short term. In the long term,
however, the employee's aggregate compensation will be lower.
85. Although this Article's analysis relies on this assumption, the assumption is
troubling. It may mask a policy choice. Workers without disabilities also need
accommodations. Workers without wheelchairs need office chairs. Workers with sight
need lights. Workers who can hear need earplugs in some loud environments. Yet, the costs
of these accommodations are typically treated as capital investments when they benefit
workers without disabilities, not wage increases. An argument has been made that the
policy choice to treat accommodations for workers with disabilities differently suggests
bias. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased
Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 167 (2000) ("Such judgments have
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before assigning an accommodation's costs to an employee's wages. At a
minimum, it may be inappropriate to charge the entire cost of an
accommodation to an individual employee with an impairment. The
ADA's Title III requires any employer providing a "public
accommodation" to make their facilities accessible to people with
disabilities; therefore, a workplace accommodation may also satisfy the
employer's obligation to accommodate the public.86  For example,
installing a ramp for an employee using a wheelchair also makes the
employer's facilities accessible to motion-impaired customers. Although
there is no legal obligation in this regard, a ramp also makes the employer's
facility more accessible for caregivers pushing strollers, bicyclists, and
others.87 The employer may benefit as a result. Thus, the cost of the ramp
should be amortized across all of its users and reduced by these other
benefits, rather than charged in its entirety to the employee with a
wheelchair. In addition, an accommodation may benefit many employees.
For example, providing a text-only feature on an employer's intranet would
benefit many employees with vision impairments, not merely the employee
who requested it. The cost of the software needed to make an employer's
intranet accessible should be spread across any employee whose
productivity increases due to the intranet's new presentation. All of these
factors should be taken into account before assigning an accommodation's
costs to an employee's wage.
ignored the many advantages conferred on the non-disabled and the disadvantages imposed
on people with disabilities by features of the environment that are virtually invisible or taken
for granted. In fact, judicial opinions have increasingly seemed to suggest that the protection
granted Americans with disabilities constitutes a kind of unreasonable bias which extends
beyond the guarantees bestowed on other individuals. No attention is devoted to the biased
reasoning produced by the failure to consider the benefits bequeathed to the non-disabled or
the penalties inflicted on disabled citizens by the existing milieu."); Stein, supra note 16, at
604-09 ("The canonical treatment of ADA accommodations views the source of whatever
extra cost their provision engenders as arising from the endogenous, inherent inability of the
disabled, rather than through the exogenous, constructed social environment.").
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 art. III (2000).
87. See Susan Stefan, "You'd Have to be Crazy to Work Here": Worker Stress, The
Abusive Workplace, and Title I of the ADA, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 795, 823 n.164 (1998)
("For example, curb cuts and ramps benefit people on bicycles, people with strollers, people
on skates, as well as people with mobility or visual impairments."); see also Vicki Shultz,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1931-32 (2000) ("Once again, making way for
'them' helps make way for all of us. The ADA requires both structural transformations-
such as building ramps-and individual accommodation-such as allowing employees to
work around their treatment schedules. These changes can benefit all of us, not simply
those of us who meet the legal definition of 'persons with disabilities.' People who push
baby strollers or ride bicycles appreciate ramps along with people in wheelchairs; and
almost everyone can benefit from flexibility in scheduling.").
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Graph #4, which is a further elaboration of Graph #3, depicts how an
accommodation may increase the employer's dividends when an after-
hiring impairment arises.8" The adjusted wage curve (WA) illustrates the
effects on the employee's wage of an accommodation provided by the
employer at or around Tenure B.s9 The employee's effective wage
increases at Tenure B as a result of the accommodation's cost and remains
at that higher level through Tenure F. In essence, the employee's effective
wage shifts up and remains higher for the duration of the employment
relationship. Because of the accommodation, the employee's productivity
returns to the level expected prior to the impairment (i.e., to MP from
MP(B)) for the duration of the employment relationship (i.e., until Tenure
88. An accommodation may be a one-time accommodation (e.g., the purchase of an
assistive device, the modification of physical work space) or a continuing accommodation
(e.g., hiring a reader for a vision-impaired employee, providing an employee with regular,
intermittent medical leaves). This analysis assumes that an employer will amortize the
accommodation's costs over the term of its relationship with the employee in either case;
accordingly, the costs of a one-time accommodation last as long as the costs of a continuing
accommodation.
89. The cost of the accommodation also could be expressed as the marginal
productivity curve shifting down because the impairment requires the employer to invest
more capital for the worker to achieve the same productivity. This would simply be another
way to express the same general concept reflected in this section's treatment of the
accommodation as a wage increase.
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F). For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the
accommodation has no greater productivity effects, although I will relax
this assumption below. 90  If the improvement in the employee's
productivity (e.g., from MPI(B) to MP) exceeds the cost of the
accommodation (i.e., WA - W), then the employer benefits from the
accommodation according to the first measure of "benefit" discussed
above: the employer is better off with the accommodation than without it.
91
The employer's dividend is larger than it would have been if the employee
continued working without the accommodation. Yet, the employer's
dividend will not return to the level it would have reached absent the
impairment. It necessarily falls short by the amount of the
accommodation's cost. The employer, therefore, does not benefit
according to the second measure: the employer is not better off with the
accommodation and the impairment than it would have been without the
impairment. But further analysis is required before arriving at a firm
conclusion about whether the second measure can be satisfied.
The effect of the accommodation on the employee's dividend is the
sum of the difference between the effective wage and the actual wage (i.e.,
WA - W) and the difference between the pre-impairment and post-
impairment opportunity wages (i.e., OW - OWI(B)). The effective wage
simply increases with the cost of the accommodation. As intuition might
suggest, a more expensive accommodation yields a higher dividend for the
employee because the difference between the aggregate effective wage and
the aggregate actual wage is greater while the opportunity wage remains at
its post-impairment level.
The opportunity wage may be the more intriguing factor. The
accommodation provided by the current employer does not affect the
employee's post-impairment opportunity wage (OW(B)). Potential future
employers neither reap productivity benefits nor pay higher wages because
the employee's previous employer had provided an accommodation.
Accommodations that involve modifications to the employee's physical
work environment, like a ramp or expanded doorways that accommodate
workers in wheelchairs, cannot be transferred from one employer to the
next. It is also reasonable to assume that an employer would not consent to
a departing employee's taking a mobile accommodation (e.g., specialized
software or an assistive device) with her to a new employer. Strictly
90. For this reason, the MPA is not relevant to the instant discussion. It becomes
relevant below. Further, the assumption made here that the employee's productivity returns
to MP as a result of the accommodation serves only to simplify this discussion and the
attending graph. It is not essential to the conclusion discussed in the next paragraph.
91. This conclusion is correct whether or not the employee's productivity returns to MP
or increases only to a level between MP and MPI(B). As long as the difference between the
employee's post-accommodation and pre-accommodation productivity exceeds the cost of
the accommodation, this conclusion stands.
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speaking, therefore, the current employer's accommodation should not
affect the employee's opportunity wage. As a result, the opportunity wage
will remain at the lower, post-impairment level (OWI(B)) after the
accommodation is provided rather than returning to the pre-impairment
level (OW). The employee's adjusted dividend, therefore, is larger after
the accommodation.
92
An objection might be raised that, while it is literally true that the next
best employer does not benefit from the current employer's provision of an
accommodation, employers in the external labor market are also subject to
the ADA's accommodation mandate. If the next best employer obeys this
mandate, then the employee's productivity in the external labor market
(and, therefore, her opportunity wage) should also return to its expected
pre-impairment level (i.e., OW). However, this objection runs counter to
the economics of the external labor market and the realities of employment
discrimination practice. The external labor market is a competitive market
in which prospective employees and employers are largely fungible.93 As
the rational choice scholars suggest, employers will not hire workers with
impairments who are made more expensive by an accommodation's costs
when they can hire comparatively cheaper workers without impairments
who do not need accommodations.94
Unfortunately, the ADA has not changed employers' decision-making
in this regard. Like other statutes' efforts to outlaw hiring discrimination,
the ADA's prohibitions on hiring discrimination are largely unenforceable,
in part because hiring discrimination claims are very difficult to prove. 95 In
92. Some employers in the external labor market may have previously modified their
workplaces to accommodate other workers with similar or identical impairments. If these
accommodations would equally benefit employees working for other employers (e.g., a
ramp for employees with wheelchairs would benefit any prospective employee using a
wheelchair), then these employees' opportunity wages would not shift down to OWI(B).
This result will occur only with accommodations that are both easily shared and made
widely available throughout the workforce. The same result would not apply to
individualized accommodations tailored to bridging the gap between an employee's
impairment and the workplace environment, like a particular assistive device or an
alternative work arrangement like telecommuting.
93. See supra text accompanying note 38-39 (discussing the external labor market).
94. This analysis presumes that the worker's impairment is known. See infra Part II.D
(discussing hidden impairments in the external labor market).
95. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 5, at 916-17 (providing empirical evidence
showing a post-ADA decline in employment of men and women aged 21-39 with
disabilities); Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 9, at 276-77 (confirming the
conclusions of Aceoglu & Angrist regarding the decline in employment of workers with
disabilities with additional empirical evidence.). See generally John J. Donohue III, Is Title
VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1411, 1426 n.26 (1986) (asserting difficulty in showing
effects of discrimination in a labor market, where there exist differences in productivity and
occupational choice); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination
Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1311, 1328 (1989) (asserting the difficulty of proving
2007]
32 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
addition, the worker has little or no investment in her relationship with any
given prospective employer in the external labor market, so she has less
incentive to incur the costs associated with a hiring discrimination claim.
96
In the absence of an enforceable prohibition on hiring discrimination that
exposes the next best employer to a genuine risk of added costs, the next
best employer cannot be expected to provide an accommodation. As a
result, the employee's opportunity wage will not return to its pre-
impairment level when the current employer provides an accommodation.
In sum, the accommodation and the impairment combine to raise the
height of the internal labor market's competitive barriers. Like firm-
specific skills and knowledge, the accommodation and the impairment
increase the benefits of the internal labor market for the employee. As with
the employee's unaccommodated impairment, the alternative to continuing
her relationship with her current employer-that is, seeking employment in
the external labor market-is less remunerative over the long term because
of her lower opportunity wage. However, the introduction of the
accommodation means that the employee also receives a higher effective
wage from her current employer than she would receive from another
employer. Thus, the competitive barrier is higher with the accommodation
and the impairment than it would be without the accommodation, and it is
significantly higher than it would be without the accommodation and the
impairment.
The preliminary conclusion of this analysis, therefore, is that an
accommodation can produce a Pareto-superior outcome when compared
with an ongoing employment relationship in which the employer does not
accommodate an incumbent employee with a disability. The result is an
increase to both the employer's and the employee's dividend. Thus,
accommodating an employee's after-hiring impairment can satisfy the first
measure of providing a benefit to the employer: the employer's dividend is
higher with the accommodation than it would have been without an
accommodation. However, this preliminary conclusion is incomplete and
does not answer the question of whether the employer would be better off
according to the second measure-that is, whether the employer is better
off continuing its relationship and accommodating the incumbent employee
with an after-hiring impairment than it would have been if the employee
did not have an impairment. The following sub-sections will add factors to
the analysis that will help answer this question.
discrimination under Title VII); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title
VII, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 513, 517-19 (1987) (explaining the difficulty of enforcing the law's
forbiddance of firing decisions based on race).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 38-63 (contrasting the nature of relationships in
the external labor market with the shared investments found in the internal labor market).
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3. The Consequences of Delaying the Accommodation
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Graph #5 depicts the consequences for the employer of delaying an
accommodation when the employee experiences an after-hiring impairment
at Tenure B. A delay could result from difficulties with identifying an
appropriate accommodation, protracted negotiations between the employer
and employee in the interactive process,97 or intransigence between the
employer and employee. 9 If the employee were to file a charge with the
EEOC, and certainly if that charge were to be litigated in federal court, then
a significant delay would be likely.99  Rather than providing the
accommodation at Tenure B, this graph assumes that the employer provides
97. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the interactive process, during
which an employer and a disabled employee negotiate reasonable accommodations).
98. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 24, at 132 (noting that US Airways took five months to
respond to Barnett's request for an accommodation).
99. See Paul Steven Miller, A Just Alternative or Just an Alternative? Mediation and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 11, 20-22 (2001) ("When mediated,
the average processing time for ADA complaints is nearly cut in half, as compared to the
time it would take the EEOC to administratively address the complaint. This time frame
includes the time from the charging party walking in the door of the EEOC to the time of
resolution or impasse. On average, ADA charges take 286 days to reach a determination in
the EEOC's administrative process. Where mediated ADA charges took on average 151
days to reach final resolution.").
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the accommodation at Tenure C. It also assumes that the employee
continues working for the employer between Tenure B and Tenure C, and
that her productivity during this period is lower (i.e., MPI(B)) because of the
impairment's interaction with the employer's unchanged work
environment.
The delay effects a small reduction in the employee's dividend
increase. The accommodation increases the employee's effective wage
from W to WA between Tenure C and Tenure F, rather than between
Tenure B and Tenure F; therefore, the aggregate wage increase is smaller.
The post-impairment opportunity wage is lower than the pre-impairment
opportunity wage, and it remains unaffected by the accommodation. By
contrast, the employer's situation is worse than if it had provided the
accommodation at Tenure B. Not only does the employer's dividend
period begin later (i.e., at Tenure B' rather than at Tenure B), but the
employee's productivity is also lower from Tenure B to Tenure C than it
otherwise would have been. Since the employee's effective wage does not
change between Tenure B and Tenure C, the employer's dividend is larger
than it would have been absent any accommodation. However, this is still
smaller than it would have been if the employer had provided the
accommodation as soon as possible after the impairment arose.' °°
This analysis enriches the preliminary conclusion: the employer can
benefit from providing an accommodation (at least according to the first
measure), but it is more likely to benefit if it accommodates the employee
as soon as possible after the impairment arises. However, timing is only
one factor, along with cost, in the economic assessment of an
accommodation. Even when an employer immediately accommodates an
employee's impairment when it arises, such that the employee's effective
wage shifts up and remains higher at Tenure B, the critical factor from the
employer's perspective is the employee's productivity. If the employee's
productivity merely returns to the level expected before the impairment
(i.e., return from MP t(B) to MP) for the remainder of the employment
relationship, then the employer's dividend will be smaller than it would
have been absent the impairment. The next sub-section examines the
accommodation's effect on productivity.
100. This difference would be narrowed to the extent that the employer is insured against
any losses that might occur during the period after the impairment and before the provision
of the accommodation. For example, workers' compensation insurance or temporary
disability insurance may provide full or partial wage replacement during this period. See,
e.g., N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §§ 1-401 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 2005) (codifying New
York State's workers' compensation law); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to 21-65 (2004)
(codifying New Jersey's temporary disability insurance law). However, because insurance
bears costs, the general principle remains true even if the employer has insured itself against
this risk.
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4. The Accommodation's Enhanced Productivity Effect
The nature of the employee's relationship with her employer changes
as a result of the employee's after-hiring impairment and the employer-
provided accommodation. The employee reaps a larger dividend which
raises the height of the competitive barrier in the internal labor market.
The higher competitive barriers effectuate a tighter binding of the
employee to the employer. This tighter bond creates an opportunity for the
employer and the employee to reduce the employer's labor costs and
increase the employee's productivity. Thus, the parties' response to the
employee's impairment and the accommodation can influence, and even
determine, the accommodation's effect on productivity. The parties are not
passive observers of economic, physical, or mental phenomena unfolding
before them. Accommodations create conditions in which the parties'
behavior can change their efficiency calculi. This sub-section will discuss
these changed conditions.
The change in the nature of the relationship between the employer and
the accommodated employee requires relaxing the assumption that an
accommodation's only productivity effect is to return the employee's
marginal productivity to its pre-impairment level. By relaxing this
assumption, it becomes possible to identify circumstances within which the
accommodation will have an enhanced productivity effect that could make
it possible to satisfy the second measure of whether an employer benefits
from providing the accommodation. In other words, the employer may be
better off providing an incumbent employee with an accommodation, than
it would have been if the employee did not have an impairment.
More tightly binding the employee to the internal labor market may
largely or entirely free the employer from potential risks of loss in its
relationship with the employee. The employee's aversion to the external
labor market increases as the opportunity wage decreases. The employee's
commitment to the internal labor market increases with her effective wage
which, as explained above, includes the accommodation's cost. As a result,
the impairment and accommodation will reduce (or even eliminate) the risk
that the employee will quit her job and seek employment elsewhere before
the employer can reap its full dividends from their relationship.' 0 ' Also, the
employee will avoid any productivity-reducing behaviors that might
subject her to being discharged into the external labor market. Thus, the
risk that the employee will shirk or engage in other strategic behavior will
be significantly reduced or eliminated. Empirical evidence supports these
conclusions. For instance, employees with disabilities receiving
101. This conclusion and others in this section are premised on the assumption that labor
supply is elastic.
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accommodations have lower job turnover rates and equivalent or lower
absenteeism rates when compared with employees without disabilities. °2
Reducing the employer's risk that an incumbent employee with a
disability will quit, shirk, or otherwise reduce her productivity may have
two effects. First, the employee's productivity increases if she shirks less,
or not at all. Second, the employer's costs of monitoring the employee to
avoid shirking decline; therefore, the employee's cost to the employer-the
effective wage-declines. However, these reductions in risk may be only
the beginning of the beneficial effects that an accommodation can have on
the productivity of an employee with an after-hiring impairment.
The employee's tighter bond to the internal labor market makes it
possible for the employee and the employer to cooperate more fully for the
purpose of increasing the employee's productivity to a level beyond what
she might have achieved absent the impairment. At a minimum, an
employee with a disability can be expected to undertake all necessary
efforts to increase her productivity over the life of her relationship with the
employer. She may, for instance, acquire firm-specific skills and
knowledge or willingly accede to her employer's job match decisions.'13 In
addition, employers may be more willing to invest in their employees'
acquisition of general skills because of the reduced risk that the employee
will quit. The accommodated employee with an after-hiring impairment is
significantly less likely to quit for the purpose of selling her general skills
to other employers. The employer can invest in the employee's acquisition
102. See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT, TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO.
12 (1996) (finding a lower turnover rate among workers with disabilities than workers
without disabilities); Rick A. Lester & Donald W. Caudill, The Handicapped Worker:
Seven Myths, 41 TRAINING & DEV. J. 50, 50 (1987) (comparing absenteeism, turnover,
productivity, and accident rates); J.E. Martin et al., Work Attendance in Competitive
Employment: Comparison Between Employees Who Are Nonhandicapped and Those Who
Are Mentally Retarded, 23 MENTAL RETARDATION 142, 145 (1985) (discussing attendance
records, overtime, and vacation time of handicapped employees who are mentally retarded
compared with nonhandicapped employees); Dolores Ondusko, Comparison of Employees
with Disabilities and Able-Bodied Workers in Janitorial Maintenance, 22 J. APPLIED
REHABILITATION COUNSELING 19, 22-23 (1991) (showing differences of turnover and
absenteeism between persons with disabilities); Stein, supra note 21, at 104-05 (finding a
lower absenteeism rate among workers with disabilities than workers without disabilities)
(citing Gretchen Adams-Shollenberger & Thomas E. Mitchell, A Comparison of Janitorial
Workers with Mental Retardation and Their Non-Disabled Peers on Retention and
Absenteeism, J. REHABILITATION, July-Sept. 1996 at 56, 59).
103. See generally Verkerke, supra note 82, at 948 ("While cost sharing responds to
unusual worker preferences, efficient job assignments in more ordinary circumstances
require matching workers to jobs in which they will be most productive. Indeed, one of the
central lessons of the economic framework is that matching plays a critical role in
promoting labor market efficiency.").
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of productivity-enhancing general skills without fear that these investments
will benefit a competitor.
Graph #4 details the progression of these steps that follow from an
employer's accommodation at Tenure B. First, when the employee does
not shirk and/or the employer and employee cooperate more fully in
productivity-enhancing behaviors, the marginal productivity curve shifts up
(i.e., from MP to MpA). Second, the employer's costs of monitoring the
employee to avoid shirking decline, causing the employee's cost to the
employer-the effective wage-to shift down. These reduced monitoring
costs may offset the increased costs of accommodation, resulting in the
same effective wage as before the accommodation (i.e., returning to W
from WA). The combined effect of higher productivity and a lower
effective wage would be to increase the employer's dividend and prolong
the dividend period (i.e., until Tenure E' rather than Tenure E).
If the difference between the employer's new, higher productivity
level and the productivity level expected before the impairment (i.e., MPA -
MP) equals the net costs of the accommodation (i.e., subtracting the
reduced monitoring costs from the gross cost of the accommodation), then
the employer will not merely reap a higher dividend through the
accommodation than it would have yielded after the employee's
impairment arose. Rather, the employer will yield the same dividend it
expected from its relationship with the employee before the after-hiring
impairment arose. If the present value of the difference between the
effective wage curve WA (or even W) and the adjusted productivity curve
(MPA) between Tenure B and Tenure E' exceeds the difference between the
marginal productivity curve (MP) and the actual wage curve (W) from
Tenure B to Tenure E, then providing the accommodation will generate a
larger dividend for the employer than the employer could have expected
before the after-hiring impairment arose.' °4 Under these circumstances, the
employer will be better off accommodating the employee with an after-
hiring impairment than it would have been if the worker did not have an
impairment. Of course, satisfying this higher standard necessarily means
satisfying the first measure's lower standard.
Thus, accounting for the enhanced productivity effect of the
accommodation enriches the preliminary conclusion. The cost and timing
of the accommodation are not the only factors relevant to determining its
economic consequences. The response of the employee and the employer
to the impairment and accommodation-that is, their ability and
willingness to cooperate and to exploit the opportunity presented to them-
is an equally critical factor.
104. 1 have not discounted the cost of the accommodation to its present value because the
cost arises at the time of the accommodation rather than over time or at a later point in time.
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In sum, the enriched-but still preliminary-conclusion of this
analysis is that employers can benefit from accommodating employees with
after-hiring impairments according to both measures of employer benefits.
The employer's dividend is likely to be higher than would have been
expected after the impairment arose (i.e., the first measure). The
employer's dividend may also be higher than would have been expected
before the impairment arose; that is, the employer may be better off
accommodating the employee with an impairment than if the employee did
not have an impairment (i.e., the second measure). This result depends
upon the accommodation's cost, which is partly a function of timing, and
its effect on the employee's productivity. Most importantly, the parties'
response to the employee's impairment and subsequent accommodation
can influence, even determine, the accommodation's effect on productivity.
The parties are not merely passive observers. Accommodations and
impairments create conditions in which the parties' behavior can determine
their economic fate.
C. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market. Transfers,
Promotions, and Job Re-Designs
The second scenario in which an incumbent employee might request
an accommodation involves a promotion or transfer into a new position in
which the employee cannot perform adequately without an
accommodation. A job may also be re-designed to include new
responsibilities that the employee will not be able to satisfy without an
accommodation. While different in many respects, promotions, transfers,
and job re-designs will all have the same effect on the relationship between
an employer and an employee with an impairment. °5 Accordingly, this
section will analyze them together.
Promotions and transfers are a predictable product of the rolling
renegotiations that occur as the employee and the employer seek to yield
both higher productivity levels and higher wages from their internal labor
market relationship.0 6 In fact, the job-match theory of the internal labor
market presupposes promotions and transfers. As the employer learns
more about an employee's abilities, the employer moves the employee into
her optimal assignment.0 7  Human capital theory would explain
105. Distinguishing this analysis from the preceding section's analysis does not require
an assumption that the employee's impairment was present at the time she was hired. The
only necessary assumption is that the impairment, regardless of when it arose, had no effect
on the employee's productivity prior to the promotion, transfer, or job re-design.
106. See supra text accompanying note 57 (discussing the rolling renegotiations that
occur in the internal labor market).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48 (discussing how an employer can
determine an employee's "optimal assignment," and how that assignment benefits both
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promotions and transfers in much the same way. Over the course of the
employee's tenure, the employee acquires firm-specific skills and
knowledge. In order to reap the fullest benefits of the employee's firm-
specific education, the employer may reassign the employee to a job that is
best performed by someone who has attained these skills and knowledge.'
0 8
In these circumstances, promotions and transfers can fulfill the employer's
expectations of rising productivity and, derivatively, the employee's
expectations of rising wages.
Promotions and transfers play a different role in supervision theory.
Understanding this role requires re-defining "wages." This new meaning
must take into account that employees may value non-pecuniary aspects of
their working environment to the same extent they value cash wages. For
example, employees may prefer to avoid strenuous physical labor, night
work, or dangerous assignments. A job with these characteristics would
impose "shadow prices" on the employee; that is, the employee values this
job less than other jobs with the same cash wage.'0 9 In other words, the
shadow prices reduce the job's effective wage for the employee. An
employee's effective wage increases when the employee transfers from a
job with shadow prices to a job without shadow prices, even if the
employee's cash wages remain the same. Similarly, a transfer to a job with
"shadow benefits"-for example, greater prestige or a larger office-would
increase the employee's effective wage. °
Unlike human capital theory and job match theory, supervision theory
detaches wages that rise with tenure from productivity that rises with
tenure."' Supervision theory posits that rising wages are a reward deferred
until later in the employee's career as an incentive for greater effort
expended earlier in the employee's career."' The employer benefits,
therefore, from finding a reward other than higher cash wages. The
employer may increase an employee's effective wage over the course of the
employee's tenure by promoting or transferring the employee from high
shadow price jobs into either lower shadow price jobs or higher shadow
benefit jobs.
parties).
108. See Harris, supra note 24, at 188 (positing that an employer learns more about the
employee's qualifications over time and, relying on that knowledge, may reassign the
employee to a more suitable position).
109. See Wim Groot & Maartje Verberne, Aging, Job Mobility, and Compensation, 49
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 380, 382-83 (1997) (discussing how an employee's valuation of a
job takes into account non-pecuniary characteristics of the position).
110. See id. at 381-82 (analyzing shadow benefits and prices in the context of elderly
workers).
11l. See supra text accompanying note 50 (pointing to a graph that explains the
dynamics of the internal and internal and external labor market relationship).
112. See id.
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For example, airline employees in cargo-handling jobs may prefer less
physically strenuous work as they age. The airline might increase these
employees' effective wages by reserving easier, lower shadow price jobs-
like sedentary jobs in a mail room-for senior workers. Employers dangle
these lower shadow prices as a delayed reward, intended to deter the cargo
handlers from shirking earlier in their careers. 13 The lower shadow prices
of the less strenuous jobs replace higher actual wages as the enforcement
tool.
Although an employer might use shadow prices and shadow benefits
to reward employees for higher productivity in a manner consistent with
human capital theory and job match theory, it is less likely. Human capital
theory and job match theory both posit a causal-if not perfect-
connection between rising productivity and rising wages throughout much
of an employee's career. 14  Rising productivity creates the additional
resources necessary to pay rising actual wages. There is no need to find a
non-cash substitute. However, if the employee agrees to accept lower
shadow prices or higher shadow benefits in lieu of cash wages, an
intriguing and important wage effect occurs: the employee and the
employer experience different effective wages. The employee's effective
wage is the actual wage plus the shadow benefit or minus the shadow price.
The employer's effective wage is simply the cash wage. Thus, the
introduction of a promotion, transfer, or job re-design that changes the
values of shadow prices and benefits would cause a divergence of the
employer's and employee's respective wage curves. This divergence will
prove relevant to assessing the effect of an accommodation on the
economics of the employment relationship.
Job re-designs will operate much like promotions and transfers.
Consistent with human capital theory or job match theory, an employee's
job might be reorganized to more effectively exploit her skills and
knowledge, thereby increasing the employee's productivity. Consistent
with supervision theory, a re-design might reduce shadow prices by
removing unpleasant aspects of the employee's job. 1 5 Thus, job-redesigns
are included in the following analysis.
Of course, an employee's impairment may have no effect on her
employer's decision to promote or transfer or to re-design a job. An
employee with an impairment who is capable of performing the essential
113. Harris, supra note 24, at 163 (discussing shadow benefits and costs as incentives).
114. See supra note 50 and text accompanying notes 41-48 (describing internal labor
market relationships and conjectural barriers to competition).
115. It is also possible to increase shadow prices with a job re-design. See, e.g., Toyota
Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187-90 (2002) (involving a plaintiff with
bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis that was newly required to open and
close car doors on the assembly line, apply oil to the cars, and wipe them down at a speedy
rate).
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functions of one job may be perfectly capable of performing the essential
functions of many jobs." 6 In addition, internal labor market theory does
not presuppose that each employee has a fixed career path laid out on the
day she commences employment. Each employee may well follow an
idiosyncratic career path." 7 As long as wages exceed productivity and the
opportunity wage, efficiencies result. It follows, therefore, that an
employee's career path may not lead inexorably to a single promotion or
transfer."8 An employee who is unable to accept one job because of her
impairment might be more productive with rising wages in a different job
without an accommodation. Accommodations also can be made in other
circumstances besides the one required for this analysis. For instance, an
employer may be accommodating the employee for the first time or may be
required to replace an old accommodation that is inadequate for the
employee's new or newly re-designed job. Nonetheless, the following
analysis is concerned only with those circumstances in which the
promotion, transfer, or job re-design: (1) necessarily precedes further
increases in wages and productivity; and (2) cannot occur unless the
employer accommodates the employee.
116. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (providing the ADA's definition of "qualified
individual with a disability").
117. See Joseph G. Altonji & Nicolas Williams, The Effects of Labor Market Experience,
Job Seniority, and Job Mobility on Wage Growth, 17 REs. LAB. ECON. 233, 243 (1998)
(discussing how the experiences of employees in the internal labor market can be unique
and varied); see also Katharine G. Abraham & Henry S. Farber, Returns to Seniority in
Union and Nonunion Jobs: A New Look at the Evidence, 42 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 4
(1988) (discussing heterogeneity among individuals and job matches); Joseph G. Altonji &
Robert A. Shakotko, Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?, 54 REv. ECON. STUD. 437, 438
(1987) (discussing the heterogeneity in turnover and wage growth).
118. See generally Harris, supra note 24, at 156-63 (discussing the role of promotions in
the various internal labor market theories).
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1. Promotions, Transfers, Job Re-Designs, and Actual Wages
Graph #6
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Graph #6 depicts the effects of an accommodation that facilitates a
promotion, transfer, or job-redesign when the employee receives higher
actual wages as her tenure increases. In this situation, the employee and
the employer have the same effective wage-that is, the actual wage. This
graph assumes that the employee's impairment, without accommodation,
would prevent her from being promoted or transferred, or her job re-
designed at Tenure B. Without the accommodation, the productivity curve
flattens as a result of the impairment (i.e., from MP to MpI(B)). As
compared with the employer's expectations of collecting a dividend from
Tenure B to Tenure E, the employer would earn a smaller dividend lasting
only from Tenure B to Tenure D". The employer would also invest more
for a longer period of time (i.e., from Tenure D", instead of Tenure E, to
Tenure F). The smaller dividend and the larger investment make it less
likely that the employer's relationship with this employee will yield a
dividend.
As with the after-hiring impairment scenario, the accommodation
changes this result. Once again, the opening assumption is that the
accommodation merely returns the employee's productivity to its expected
level (i.e., back to MP from MPI(B)). However, unlike with the analyses of
an after-hiring impairment, the employee's opportunity wage curve (OW)
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does not shift down as a consequence of the impairment. The employee's
productivity with another employer would not be affected by her current
employer's inability to promote or transfer the employee or redesign her
job. This difference proves to be very important.
The remaining factor in this efficiency analysis is the employee's
effective wage. The effective wage includes the costs of the
accommodation. The adjusted wage curve (WA) depicts the effect of an
accommodation on both parties' effective wage. The effective wage shifts
up at Tenure B and remains higher from Tenure B through Tenure F. The
essential calculus has not changed. If the productivity increase (i.e., MP -
MPi(B)) exceeds the cost of the accommodation (i.e., WA - W), then the
accommodation benefits the employer according to our first measure. The
employer's dividend will be greater than it would have been if the
employer did not provide the accommodation, which resulted in the
employee being denied a promotion, transfer, or job re-design. Still, the
question remains whether the employer would earn a higher dividend than
he expected before learning that the impairment would inhibit the
promotion, transfer, or job re-design-that is, whether the second measure
can be satisfied. The answer to this inquiry depends upon whether this
impairment and accommodation will effect a further increase in the
employee's productivity.
As the previous section explained, the enhanced productivity effect is
a possible consequence of the increase in the employee's dividend. In the
after-hiring impairment scenario, the employee reaped a larger dividend
because her impairment drove her opportunity wage down and the
accommodation drove her effective wage up. In this situation, however,
the employee's dividend increases only by the amount of the cost of the
accommodation. The impairment does not cause the opportunity wage to
shift down; therefore, the dividend increases only in the amount of the
effective wage minus the wage (the cost of accommodation, i.e., WA - W),
because the employer's opportunity wage (OW) remains constant. Thus,
the employee's increased dividend is probably smaller than the dividends
reaped from an after-hiring impairment, but is likely larger than it would
have been in the absence of the impairment and accommodation.
This larger dividend more tightly binds the employee to the internal
labor market, but to a lesser extent than in the after-hiring impairment
scenario. Nonetheless, conditions will be created for less shirking, lower
monitoring costs, and greater productivity-enhancing cooperation than
would have been possible absent the impairment and accommodation. 1'9
However, productivity may not increase and costs may not decrease as
much as they might have with the accommodation of an after-hiring
119. Again, this assumes some elasticity of labor supply.
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impairment. As a result, the possibility that the employer's dividend will
increase beyond the expected dividend is smaller. This situation may
satisfy the first measure of whether the employer benefits from the
accommodation, but it is less likely that it will meet the second measure-
that the employer is better off with the accommodation and impairment.
Yet, some possibility of meeting the second measure remains.
2. The Role of Shadow Prices and Shadow Benefits
Graph #7
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Graph #7 introduces shadow prices and shadow benefits into the
analysis. Again, it is assumed that the accommodation and the promotion,
transfer, or job re-design occur at Tenure B. The employer's position
depicted in Graph #6 does not change, so it is not repeated on Graph #7;
however, there is a different explanation for the changes in the employee's
position. The employee's effective "wage" no longer consists merely of
the actual wage or, after the accommodation, the actual wage plus the cost
of accommodation. The effective wage takes into account the fact that the
employee has been promoted or transferred into a job or had her job-
redesigned so her resultant position has lower shadow prices or higher
shadow benefits. Thus, the employee's effective wage curve (WA) is the
sum of the actual wage, the cost of the accommodation, and the jobs'
shadow prices and benefits.
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The employer's effective wage changes for the same reasons, but in a
different way. Shadow prices and shadow benefits reflect employee
preferences, but they do not contribute to the employer's effective wage
curve. The employer's effective wage is merely the equivalent of the
employee's actual wage; therefore, the employer's effective wage is lower
than the employee's effective wage. On Graph #7, W illustrates the
employee's effective wage absent the accommodation-meaning, the
actual wage with shadow prices or benefits. The We. curve illustrates the
employer's effective wage without an accommodation if: (1) the employee
could be promoted, transferred, or have her job re-designed; and (2) the
promotion, transfer, or job re-design reduces shadow prices or increases
shadow benefits. It is the employee's actual wage without shadow prices
or benefits. The difference between W and Wer is the value of the shadow
prices or shadow benefits to the employee. 20
The inability to promote or transfer the employee or re-design her job
because of her impairment causes a reduction of the employer's dividend.
Without the impairment, the employer had expected to earn dividends from
Tenure B to Tenure E". The unaccommodated impairment will cause the
employer to earn smaller dividends and over a shorter period, from Tenure
B to Tenure E. Adding the accommodation into the calculus has two
effects. First, the employee's productivity returns to either its expected
course (i.e., from MP(B) to MP) or to the higher curve (MPA) that might
result from the accommodation's enhanced productivity effect. Second, the
effective wage curve shifts up to WAer. Once again, the question of whether
the employer benefits can be answered by comparing the accommodation's
productivity effect with its cost. If the productivity increase (i.e., MPA -
MP l(B) or MP - MPl(B)) exceeds the cost of the accommodation (i.e., WAer -
Wer), then the employer will reap a larger dividend as a result of the
accommodation, thereby satisfying the first measure.
The role of shadow prices in this calculus highlights how the parties
might choose to resolve an accommodations dispute in a manner that the
ADA does not approve: a wage concession by the employee. Without the
accommodation, the promotion, transfer, or job re-design would confer
120. 1 have assumed that shadow prices would change the slope of the employer's
effective wage curve (Wer) relative to the employee's effective wage curve (W). The slope
would change if the employer prefers, as the employee's tenure increases, that shadow
prices play an increasing role and actual cash wages play a declining role. It is reasonable to
assume that employers would prefer lower labor costs over time. But this assumption is not
essential to the analysis. If shadow prices play a constant role over the course of the
employment relationship, the employer's effective wage curve (We and WAer) would be
parallel to the employee's effective wage curve (W). Further, the difference between the
employee's effective wage curve and the employer's effective wage curve would remain the
value of the shadow prices and benefits associated with the job into which the employee has
been promoted or transferred, or the job re-design.
2007]
46 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:1
lower shadow prices or higher shadow benefits on the employee in lieu of
higher actual wages. The accommodation makes this substitution process
less likely. The added real cost of the accommodation eliminates or
reduces the employer's benefit from promoting or transferring the
employee into a position with lower shadow prices or re-designing her job
to reduce shadow prices. Thus, the employer will make the promotion,
transfer, or job re-design only if it will receive something in return-that is,
higher productivity or, perhaps, a wage concession from the employee.
Higher productivity is possible, as the preceding analysis demonstrated;
however, it may not be sufficient or it may not occur at all.
The question still remains: why would the employee agree to a wage
concession, particularly when the law prohibits the employer from
requiring it?121 The simple answer is that the employee faces a lower-than-
expected wage if she is not promoted or transferred, or her job is not re-
designed. The employee's actual wage, or her effective wage taking
shadow prices and benefits into account, will not rise because the
promotion, transfer, or job re-design is the pre-condition for higher wages.
Yet, the promotion, transfer, or job re-design will occur only if the
employer provides the accommodation. Thus, this employee must choose
between: (1) agreeing with the employer to reduce the employee's future
wage increases in exchange for an accommodation that leads to higher
actual or effective wages; or (2) refusing to adjust her wages and being
denied the promotion, transfer, or job re-design, without which she will
receive no future increase in wage. Given this choice, the employee may
well volunteer for smaller wage increases to help pay for an
accommodation that will lead to a larger wage increase over time. An
agreement of this sort might allow the employer to satisfy the second
measure of employer benefits.
While the promotion/transfer/job re-design scenario may best illustrate
the circumstances in which a wage concession is plausible, wage
concessions may also change the economic calculus for after-hiring
impairments. Any change of circumstances prompted by an
accommodation that allows productivity increases to match or exceed
increases in the effective wage resulting from an accommodation, sets the
stage for a discussion about wage concessions between the parties. Once
121. See generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE ADA:
YOUR EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AS AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A DISABILITY,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/adal8.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2005) ("The ADA requires that
the employer provide the accommodation unless to do so would impose an undue hardship
on the operation of the employer's business. If the cost of providing the needed
accommodation would be an undue hardship, the employee must be given the choice of
providing the accommodation or paying for the portion of the accommodation that causes
the undue hardship."); cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000) (imposing the obligation to
provide the accommodation on the employer with no reference to the employee).
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again, the employer and the employee have the opportunity to determine
the economic outcomes through discussions of productivity and wages.
Thus, the preliminary conclusion about whether an employer can
benefit from accommodating an employee subject to a promotion, transfer,
or job re-design differs slightly from the conclusion reached with respect to
employees with after-hiring impairments. It is still possible that an
employer could benefit according to both measures. The employer may be
better off with the accommodation than without the accommodation (i.e.,
the first measure). As with the after-hiring impairment, this result
principally depends upon the accommodation's cost and its effect on the
employee's productivity. However, the employee's preferences, expressed
in the form of shadow prices and shadow benefits, will also be relevant
when determining whether the employer will benefit. The employer may
also be better off with the accommodation than it would have been if the
employee did not have an impairment (i.e., the second measure), although
this result may be less likely in this scenario than in the other situation
where the employee has an after-hiring impairment. The competitive
barriers will not be as high in this scenario, but it is less likely that shadow
prices and shadow benefits may expand the opportunity to reduce labor
costs and increase the employee's productivity. Still, some opportunity
does exist. An opportunity also exists for the parties to discuss other
changes in their relationship, like wage concessions, that will affect the
desired result. Once again, the parties can determine the outcome.
D. Efficient Accommodations in the Internal Labor Market: Hidden
Impairments
J. Hoalt Verkerke provided a well-considered analysis of the
consequences that unobservable or "hidden" impairments may have on
workers' employment searches in the external labor market.'22 His analysis
provides a starting place for consideration of the effects of hidden
impairments on internal labor market relationships.
Verkerke started with the premise that employee turnover can be
efficient. An employee who changes jobs to improve the match between
her job and her skills and knowledge, or even her impairment, increases her
productivity and her wages.2 3  Yet, hidden impairments frustrate the
matching process. Verkerke posited that the worker's hidden impairment
122. Verkerke, supra note 82, at 910-11.
123. Id. Verkerke's assessment of turnover's role in the external labor market is
consistent with the job match theory assessment of the role of intra-firm job change. See
supra text accompanying notes 46-48; see also J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of
Employment Reference Practices, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 117 (1998) (discussing the role of
job matching in labor market efficiency).
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would effect a self-perpetuating series of failures in the matching process.
Employer #1 learns about the worker's hidden impairment through its
experience with the worker's failure to satisfy productivity expectations.
Unconstrained by the ADA, Employer #1 discharges the worker into the
external labor market. Employer #2 hires the worker without knowing that
the worker has the hidden impairment because Employer #1, in order to
avoid a defamation claim by the discharged worker, does not disclose that
the worker has the impairment. 12 4 Employer #2, therefore, cannot assess
the effects of the worker's impairment on her future productivity in the job
into which she would be hired.125 Thus, there will be a mismatch between
the worker and the job with Employer #2. The cycle then repeats itself.
Employer #2 will discharge the worker into the external labor market as it
learns more about her deficient productivity, but it will not disclose the
hidden impairment to Employer #3. Employer #3 will discharge the
worker and fail to disclose her impairment, as well. The result will be
serial discharges of the worker, or "churning," and subsequent "scarring"
of the employer, in Verkerke's lexicon. The worker's record of serial
discharges will eventually deter employers from hiring the worker
regardless of the actual quality of the match between the worker's abilities
and the prospective job. 2 6 Inefficiency and market failure will result.
The ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate serves as a brake on
this process. The ADA encourages employees to disclose their
impairments in return for the prospect of being accommodated.
27 Also,
rather than immediately discharging the unproductive employee, the
employer must endeavor to find a reasonable accommodation for her
impairment. If an accommodation can be found that would allow the
employee to increase her productivity to the expected level, then the
employer may not discharge the employee and the inefficiencies of
churning and scarring will be avoided. 128 In sum, Verkerke argues that the
ADA facilitates the smooth and efficient operation of the external labor
market. This section will explain how the ADA's accommodation mandate
can have the same effects in the internal labor market.
124. Verkerke, supra note 82, at 914-15.
125. Verkerke also correctly notes that the ADA prohibits the employer from seeking
medical information that might disclose the hidden impairment before employment
commences and limits such requests after hiring commences. See id. at 924-26.
126. See id. at 915-23 (describing the cause and effects of "churning" and "scarring").
127. See id. at 936.
128. See id. at 934-36.
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Graph #8 depicts the internal labor market relationship between an
employer and an employee with a hidden impairment. The employee is
hired with the impairment at Tenure A, but the employer learns about the
impairment at Tenure B. Absent the accommodation, the employee's
entire productivity curve would be lower than the employer's pre-hiring
expectations (i.e., MPl(A) rather than MP) because the hidden impairment
inhibits the employee's ability to perform. However, the opportunity wage
does not change, because, even though the employee's actual productivity
with the next best employer would be lower, the impairment would be
hidden from all employers in the external labor market. Verkerke's
analysis suggests that this market failure would cause other employers to
pay the employee the same wage they would pay an employee without an
impairment, at least at the outset of their relationship. The current
employer pays the expected wage (W) to the employee.
The results are entirely predictable. The employee's dividend remains
unchanged because its determinants-wage and opportunity wage-do not
differ from the employer's and the employee's expectations. The
employer's dividend, however, is smaller than expected and lasts for a
shorter period of time (i.e., from Tenure B' to Tenure D' rather than Tenure
B to Tenure E) because of the employee's unexpectedly low productivity.
The accommodation is introduced at Tenure B. The wage curve shifts
up to reflect the cost of the accommodation. As before, WA represents the
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wage taking into account the accommodation's cost. At a minimum,
productivity returns to its expected course (i.e., to MP from Mp(A)). The
first measure of employer benefits asks whether the employer is better off
than it would have been if it continued its relationship with the employee
without providing an accommodation. Once again, if the value of the
employee's increased productivity exceeds the accommodation's costs,
then the employer benefits according to the first measure. In other words,
if the employee's productivity returns to its expected level (i.e., to MP from
MpI(A)), then the question of whether the employer derives a benefit can be
answered by comparing the increase in productivity (MP - MPl(A)) to the
increase in the effective wage (WA - W).
The second measure of employer benefits asks whether the employer
will get a larger dividend with the accommodation than it would have
received without the accommodation and the impairment. In this scenario,
a larger dividend would result only if the employee's productivity
increased beyond its expected level (i.e., MPA rather than MP) and,
therefore, exceeded the accommodation's cost. However, an enhanced
productivity effect is less likely in this scenario than in the after-hiring
impairment scenario, and about as likely as in the promotion-transfer-job-
redesign scenario. The opportunity wage explains the difference. In the
after-hiring impairment scenario, the employee earned a larger dividend
increased by the cost of the accommodation and the decreased value of the
opportunity wage. In this scenario and the promotion-transfer-job-redesign
scenarios, the employee's dividend increased only by the amount of the
accommodation's costs. As a result, the competitive barriers are lower in
the latter two scenarios than in the after-hiring impairment scenario. Any
productivity benefits from the higher competitive barriers are likely to be
smaller, if they occur at all. Thus, the productivity increase may exceed the
cost of an inexpensive accommodation, like a one-time accommodation,
but it is less likely to exceed the expense of a more costly, continuing
accommodation. The employer is, therefore, less likely to benefit when
compared with its position absent the employee's impairment.
This preliminary conclusion resembles the conclusions reached in the
two preceding sections. An employer can benefit from accommodating an
employee with a hidden impairment. Depending upon the
accommodation's cost and its effect on the employee's productivity, the
employer may be better off with the accommodation than without the
accommodation (i.e., the first measure). It is somewhat less likely that the
employer will also be better off with the accommodation than it would
have been if the employee did not have an impairment (i.e., the second
measure). As with the promotion-transfer-job-redesign scenario, the
competitive barriers will not be as high in this scenario as in the after-hiring
impairment scenario. But some increase will result from the employer's
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provision of the accommodation, so some opportunity exists for the parties
to use the interactive process to negotiate over labor costs, productivity,
and other matters that will influence the economic results of the
accommodation.
All three analyses in this part strongly suggest that employers can, and
in some cases will, derive economic benefits from accommodating their
employees with disabilities, even taking into account only the factors
contained within the narrow boundaries of the employer-employee
relationship. Assuming that this relationship will continue, this part has
shown that the employer will often benefit from accommodating the
employee. The more difficult question is whether the employer would be
better off than it would have been if it had never hired the employee with a
disability. This part has considered this issue in the guise of the
hypothetical question of whether the employer is better off with the
accommodation than it would have been if the employee did not have an
impairment, and the results were decidedly mixed. However, these
preliminary results have not yet taken into account the costs associated with
substituting an employee without a disability for the employee with a
disability. The next part will consider these costs and move the economic
analysis of accommodation benefits for employers closer to a final
conclusion.
III. THE OPPORTUNITY BENEFITS OF WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS
Many of the scholars considering the economic effects of the ADA's
accommodation mandate have assumed that accommodations issues are
resolved in a competitive labor market. 29 This assumption presupposes
that the employer makes a costless or low-cost choice between an
employee with an impairment and an employee without an impairment.
Relying on this assumption, these scholars would likely reject the analyses
in the preceding part because the analyses presume that the employer
would continue employing an individual with an impairment after the
employee had requested an accommodation. In a competitive labor market,
where costless exchanges of employees are possible, employers would
129. See, e.g., Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 5, at 920 ("The theoretical consequences
of the ADA are explored using a standard competitive model .... "); Donohue, Legislatively
Mandated Benefits, supra note 10, at 910-11; Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note
9, at 233-42 (offering an analysis that is dependent upon supply and demand setting wages
and employment levels, thereby implying a competitive labor market). By contrast, both
Michael Stein and J. Hoalt Verkerke have argued that the ADA addresses significant market
failures in the labor market, thereby suggesting that these markets are not entirely
competitive. See Stein, supra note 21; Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality,
and Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000); Verkerke, supra
note 82. For a discussion of Verkerke's analysis, see Part lI.D.
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simply trade the old employee for a new employee. But exchanging an
incumbent employee with an impairment in the internal labor market for a
new worker without an impairment from the external labor market is not
costless. This Part will discuss the costs of this exchange and how they
should factor into the calculations of the potential accommodation benefits
received by employers.
The preceding Part identified three scenarios in which an employee
with an impairment might request an accommodation from her employer,
and analyzed the economic benefits that an employer might derive from
providing that employee with an accommodation. This Part will add the
final piece to this cost-benefit analysis. An employer who provides an
accommodation to an incumbent employee avoids certain predictable costs.
Just as the wage an employee might earn in the external labor market is an
opportunity cost of remaining with the employee's current employer (i.e.,
the "opportunity wage"), these avoided costs might be called the
accommodation's opportunity benefits. These opportunity benefits are
another important factor in determining whether an employer benefits from
providing an accommodation.
The employer might not take opportunity benefits into account when
an accommodation's benefits otherwise exceed its costs. Opportunity
benefits are relevant in those situations in which the costs of the
accommodation exceed its benefits, and most relevant where the difference
is small. If an accommodation's opportunity benefits exceed the difference
between the present value of an accommodation's costs (i.e., the difference
between the employee's effective wage and actual wage) and the present
value of the accommodation's productivity benefits (i.e., the difference
between the employee's productivity with the accommodation and without
it), then the economically rational employer should choose to provide the
accommodation.
A. Opportunity Benefits and the Internal Labor Market's Efficiencies
Apart from the direct productivity dividends an employer derives from
a long-term relationship with an incumbent employee in the internal labor
market, the employer also benefits by not having to bear the transaction
costs of searching for a new employee in the external labor market. Each
step in a hiring process entails transaction costs. Among other benefits of
retaining an incumbent employee, the employer need not solicit and screen
resumes from applicants for the vacated job, review credentials and
references, interview applicants, and decide which applicant to hire, among
other hiring-related activities. But these opportunity benefits are only the
beginning. This section will consider how an employer's failure to provide
an accommodation to an incumbent employee with a disability might
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indirectly sabotage its other employees' productivity, thereby increasing its
labor costs and undermining the efficient operation of the internal labor
market.
An employer's refusal to provide an accommodation may cause the
employee to sever her relationship with the employer. The employee may
be literally incapable of working without an accommodation in the job to
which the employer has assigned her. For example, an employee who
suffers a severe back injury may be unable to work in a job with heavy
lifting responsibilities. 30  Or, the employee may simply quit out of
frustration or anger. In both of these situations, the employer could suffer a
loss. The employee with an impairment may have generated dividends
(i.e., productivity in excess of wage) without the accommodation, even if
those dividends would have been smaller than the employer expected. For
example, an employee with a bad back might have been productive in a
sedentary job that did not require lifting. Separation would cause these
dividends to be lost. In addition, the employer would lose any unrecouped
investments it has sunk into the worker's acquisition of skills and
knowledge, or its own acquisition of information about the employee's
optimal job match.
If the employee does not separate from the employer, she may feel
that her expectational interests in promotions, transfers, job re-designs, or
rising wages have been frustrated. Her frustration may cause her to shirk.
Or, the employee may conclude that the employer's denial of her
accommodation request is strategic behavior. For example, if the employer
refused to provide an accommodation that the employee needs in order to
accept a promotion that will result in higher wages,"' the employee may
conclude that the employer has chosen to appropriate her expected wage
increases for itself. The employee's response may be to shirk as a means of
recovering her lost dividends. Even if the employee does not perceive the
employer's action as strategic behavior, she may perceive that the employer
has discriminated against her or treated her unfairly. As a result, her
morale may suffer, which might also lead the employee to shirk.
Shirking for any reason decreases the employee's productivity. It
would also force the employer to invest additional resources in monitoring
the employee's performance.' 32 The failure to provide the accommodation,
130. See Harris, supra note 24, at 180-81 (describing how U.S. Airways refused to grant
Barnett his accommodation thereby forcing him to quit and search for another employer).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
132. "Shirking" is nothing more or less than the employee's failure to contribute actively
to improving firm productivity. It might include slothfulness, a refusal to assist the
employer with problem-solving, or any omission or commission that deprives the employer
of the productivity benefits of the worker's firm-specific skills. See Alan Hyde, In Defense
of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 159, 183 (1991); Schwab, supra note 44, at
21; see generally Lisa E. Key, Co- Worker Morale, Confidentiality, and the Americans with
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therefore, could cause the employee's productivity to decline and the
effective wage to rise-that is, precisely the opposite effect that providing
the accommodation might have had.'3 3 Yet, shirking entails risks for the
employer and the employee beyond its direct effects on productivity and
the employee's effective wage. If shirking causes the employee's
productivity to decline sufficiently, the employer may be deprived of any
remaining dividends it might have earned from its relationship with the
employee. Lacking an economic rationale for continuing the relationship,
the employer may discharge the shirking employee. 3 4 Both parties would
lose any benefits that could have been derived from their relationship, and
the employer would be required to invest in searching for a new employee.
Thus, failing to provide an accommodation may lead to separation and all
of the consequences associated with it, either by an immediate choice of the
employee or indirectly as a result of shirking.
The employer's response to one employee's accommodation request
may also have consequences for its relationships with other workers. The
group of workers most likely to be affected would be other incumbent
employees. As a general matter, incumbent employees have good
information about their co-workers' wages and productivity, and other
matters that are relevant to their implicit contracts with the employer.'3 5
Simply, incumbent employees pay attention to the employer's treatment of
their co-workers because the co-worker's relationship with the employer
may be relevant to the employees' own relationships with the employer.
Like the employee seeking an accommodation, other incumbent employees
may perceive the employer's decision as a signal that the employer may
engage in strategic behavior.'36 Some co-workers may also value a
workplace culture of respect in which the employer searches for ways to
allow every employee to make a contribution. Co-workers' most negative
response would be to quit or shirk and thereby deprive the employer of
Disabilities Act, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (1997) (discussing how lower employee
morale might result in increased cost to the employer).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 98-101, and 118 (showing the elasticity of
the labor supply market and the overall benefits of providing accommodations for impaired
workers).
134. See H. Lome Carmichael, Self-Enforcing Contracts, Shirking and Life Cycle
Incentives, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 65, 67-68 (1989); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining
Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search for Bargaining Equity and Industrial
Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 432 (1992).
135. See Harris, supra note 56, at 1208-09. This general situation differs from the
particular situation of accommodations and disabilities which is characterized by
asymmetric information. Incumbent employees have the best information in a unionized
workplace because the union becomes a repository for institutional history as the workers'
representative on wages, hours, terms, and conditions of employment. See id. at 1210 n.91.
136. See generally supra text accompanying notes 58-63 (discussing "strategic" or
"opportunistic" behavior).
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some or all of his productivity. More likely, these incumbent employees
would seek some kind of procedural protections against future acts of
opportunism by the employer.'37 These protections could range from
organizing a union to insisting on written contracts or explicit rules spelled
out in an employee handbook. Any of these responses would entail
potentially substantial additional costs for the employer.
These negative responses stand at one end-point on a spectrum of
possibilities. A second, mid-range possibility is that incumbent employees
without disabilities will view their employer's rejection of an
accommodation request as entirely irrelevant to their work life. Employees
without disabilities may not expect to need or request an accommodation.
They may also view the employer's accommodation decisions as
qualitatively different from other decisions that will affect their work lives
like raises, promotions, training opportunities, or other workplace benefits.
If the other incumbent employees draw these conclusions, then their
relationships with the employer will not change and the employer will
experience no additional costs.
A third possibility is that incumbent employees without disabilities
will view the employer's denial of an accommodation request as a wholly
appropriate refusal to provide a "special benefit" to the employee
requesting the accommodation. This is the opposite end-point on the
spectrum from the negative responses described above. Incumbent
employees without disabilities may feel that, by withholding an
accommodation, the employer has refused to engage in favoritism for an
employee with a disability. Further, circumstances may arise in which
incumbent employees without disabilities consider themselves to be
competing with an employee with a disability for some workplace benefit
(e.g., a promotion, a transfer, retention in a layoff). In this context,
incumbent employees without a disability may perceive the
accommodation as an unfair competitive advantage for the employee with a
disability. In US. Airways v. Barnett,"3' for example, plaintiff Barnett
sought to remain in his mail-room position as an accommodation for his
weak back. According to the employer's seniority system, the mail-room
position should have been open for seniority-based bidding by other
employees. Two co-workers with more seniority than Barnett wanted to
bid on the mail-room job. 39 It is entirely plausible, even likely, that these
senior co-workers would have perceived the employer granting the
137. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 134, at 431 (discussing how unions prevent employers
from engaging in opportunistic behavior); Schwab, supra note 44, at 32-38 (discussing
contract protections enforced by courts for the protection of workers throughout their life
cycles).
138. 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (5-4 decision).
139. See id. at 394.
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requested accommodation as an unfair advantage for Barnett.140 In these
circumstances, the incumbent employees without disabilities would
applaud the employer's denial of the accommodation request and, perhaps,
view it as evidence of the vitality of their internal labor market
relationships. Once again, the employer would suffer no additional costs
due to the co-workers' reactions to its accommodation decision.
Co-workers without disabilities may respond to an employer's denial
of an accommodation in any of these ways, or variations thereof. Their
responses will depend on whether they expect to need an accommodation
in the future, whether they view accommodations decisions as
representative of the employer's approach to other human capital issues,
and their assessment of whether they are in competition with the employee
with a disability. For these same reasons, co-workers with disabilities can
be expected to judge matters differently. Depending upon the nature of
their impairments and jobs, these employees are more inclined to view
themselves as likely to need an accommodation at some point in the future.
The employer's response to an accommodation request, therefore, would
foreshadow future issues in these employees' own employment
relationships.' 4' Further, the work experiences of employees with
disabilities would likely cause them to view accommodations as necessary
measures to facilitate performance and eliminate discriminatory barriers in
the workplace rather than "special benefits." These employees may also be
more likely to adopt the view that the employer's denial of an
accommodations request is strategic behavior. Accordingly, incumbent
employees with disabilities are more likely to respond to an employer's
denial of an accommodation by seeking new employment or some form of
assurance that they will receive their dividends from the internal labor
market relationship. As a result, the employer may experience a loss of
these employees' productivity, loss of its sunk investments, and higher
labor costs.
The employer's denial of its employee's accommodation request may
also affect the behavior of prospective employees in the external labor
market, although this effect is less likely. In theory, prospective employees
would learn of the employer's refusal to provide the accommodation and,
in response, either refuse any job the employer might offer or demand
written protections to codify the implicit contract that is formed upon entry
140. Id. at 395 (discussing alteration of the seniority system as an undue hardship for the
employees that relied on the system). I have argued that this perception is partly the
consequence of the employer's failure to explain the role of workplace accommodations to
the co-workers. See Harris, supra note 24, at 169.
141. It is always perilous to make general statements about the attitudes of people with
disabilities because the disability community is diverse and, at times, diffuse. See JOSEPH P.
SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
323-24 (1994).
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into the internal labor market. 42 However, reputation has a weaker effect
in the external labor market than in the internal labor market, if it has any
effect at all. Simply, workers in the external labor market have
significantly less information about the employer than incumbent
employees have. Even outside the disabilities context, the relationship
between an employer and a prospective employee is characterized by
asymmetric information. 43 Thus, these workers may never learn about the
employer's decision to deny the accommodation. If the information gets
out, workers in the external labor market may be less interested. They tend
to be younger than incumbent employees and would not necessarily be
making a long-term commitment to that particular employer. 44 Thus, they
are less concerned with issues related to job security and less likely to value
or recognize a firm's reputation.
45
Just like in the internal labor market, workers with disabilities in the
external labor market may be more attentive to an employer's
accommodations policies and practices than workers without disabilities.
Because an accommodation could determine whether the worker will reap
the long-term benefits of an implicit contract with the employer, it may be
the single most important piece of information for the worker's decision
about which employment opportunity to pursue. Yet, the information may
not be available, and the worker may be hesitant to inquire too deeply into
the employer's accommodations policies and practices out of fear of losing
a job opportunity. Some workers may have an informal network of
contacts within the employer's organization which can provide
information. 146 However, those who do not must depend upon some form
of public disclosure to learn about how an employer treats its employees
with disabilities.
Without public disclosure, most workers with disabilities in the
external labor market will be unable to base their decisions on the
employer's accommodations policies and practices. A mismatch may
142. See Cohen & Wachter, supra note 63, § 6.3 at 115-16 (explaining that certain
provisions can be made that are explicit contracts protecting workers in the internal labor
market).
143. See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 40, at 234.
144. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Tenure Summary (Sept. 8,
2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/tenure.nr0.htm (showing that median
employee tenure is higher among older workers than younger ones). For example, in
January 2004, the median tenure of workers age 55 to 64 (9.3 years) was more than three
times that of workers age 25 to 34 (2.9 years). Id.
145. Schwab, supra note 44, at 31-32. See also PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE 74-75 & n.53 (1990) (arguing that job candidates under appreciate the
probability of their dismissal from the firm).
146. See Harris, supra note 56, at 1209. Workers may have social relationships with
employees of the employer with whom the workers are negotiating. These social
relationships, even acquaintanceships, may provide sources of useful information.
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result if the worker accepts the employer's job offer. A better match would
be a job with an employer that is willing to accommodate the worker's
particular impairment, or an employer that would not need to accommodate
the worker's impairment. The worker's lack of information, therefore,
could lead to market failure and losses for the employer. On the other
hand, public disclosure may cause workers with disabilities to shy away
from seeking jobs with the employer or to insist upon some form of
assurance that they will receive the accommodations they will need. Like
Verkerke's "churning" and "scarring," the signal from the employer's
accommodation decision could prevent a worker from being matched to a
job with the employer in which she would be highly productive-a market
failure that would also effect a loss for the employer.
Thus, the preliminary conclusions in the preceding Part that an
employer can benefit from accommodating an employee with a disability
must be enriched with an understanding of opportunity benefits.
Opportunity benefits increase the likelihood that an employer will gain
from an accommodation. If avoiding the costs of searching for a new
employee represents the first category of opportunity benefits, then a
second category relates to the employee's productivity, the productivity of
her co-workers, and the transaction costs associated with maintaining
productive employment relationships with all of these employees.
Accommodations may avoid shirking, quitting, and demands for procedural
protections that are not typical of the implicit contractual arrangements in
the internal labor market. Accommodations may also avoid negative
effects to the employer's reputation in the external labor market, although
these effects are less likely and their consequences more difficult to
measure. These potential opportunity benefits must be considered when
determining whether an employer benefits from accommodating an
employee with an impairment. The next section will discuss another
category of costs that can be avoided by an employer who accommodates
an employee with a disability: litigation costs.
B. Litigation Costs
The ADA, together with state and local anti-discrimination statutes,
add the potentially substantial cost of a discrimination lawsuit to an
employer's economic analysis of an employee's request for an
accommodation. Simply, the employee who is denied an accommodation
may bring a discrimination claim against the employer. The ADA defines
"discrimination" to include the failure to provide a reasonable
accommodation for a qualified individual's known physical or mental
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impairment.1 47  Thus, an employee who can demonstrate that she is a
"qualified individual with a disability" 141 may initiate a lawsuit against her
employer if it denies her accommodation request.
There is no assurance that an employee's discrimination claim will
succeed. To the contrary, there is evidence that employers have a
disproportionately high success rate in ADA cases that proceed to final
judgment in federal court. 49 The Supreme Court has reduced plaintiffs'
chances of success by significantly narrowing the scope of the ADA's
protected class 5° and interpreting the ADA's defenses favorably for
employers.'5 ' Nonetheless, the employer bears some risk of losing, even if
that risk may be small. 5 2 Losing in litigation could subject the employer to
the costs of the accommodation it refused to provide plus back pay,
reinstatement, and other remedies.'53
Winning avoids court-imposed remedies, but it does not free the
employer from the transaction costs of conducting litigation. The employer
147. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000).
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
149. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (showing that employers win more than ninety-
three percent of the ADA cases brought against them); Study Finds Employers Win Most
ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 403 (1998) (discussing a report by the American Bar Association analyzing almost
every reported and unreported case brought under Title I of the ADA and finding that
employers won on average 92.1% of the cases).
150. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (holding
that an employee must be prevented or severely restricted from doing tasks central to most
people's daily lives before she will be found to have a "disability"); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999) (holding that whether an individual has a
disability is determined by taking into account natural adjustments he has made to his
impairment); Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that whether an employee
has a "disability" is determined by taking into account the mitigating factors that he
employs); Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 492-94 (1999) (holding that corrective
and mitigating measures, including eyeglasses, should be considered in determining whether
an individual is disabled under the ADA, and that for an employee to be "substantially
limited" in the major life activity of "working," she must be excluded from a broad class of
jobs). See also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(holding that states are immune from suit under the ADA's Title I).
151. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (employer may rely on
"business necessity" defense when prohibiting an employee from working in a job that
could jeopardize his health); US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 392 (2002) (5-4
decision) (holding that an employer's showing that an accommodation request conflicts with
seniority rules is sufficient to show that the accommodation is "ordinarily" not reasonable).
152. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2007) (making it an unlawful employment
practice for an employer, because of a person's disability [or a host of other categories], to
refuse to hire or continue to employ such an individual).
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (the ADA's remedies provision); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-12.1 (West 2007) (illustrating New Jersey's remedies provision for disabilities
discrimination cases).
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must retain lawyers, respond to an EEOC investigation of the employee's
complaint, conduct and respond to discovery, and pay other litigation-
related expenses. The employer must also bear the cost of any time which
human resources personnel, managers, and other employees dedicate to
depositions, document requests, meetings with lawyers, and appearances in
court. 5 4 Litigation also publicly discloses the employer's decision to deny
an accommodation and thereby increases the likelihood that prospective
employees in the external labor market will learn about the decision. 5
The employer's costs will be lower if it can defeat the claim with a
dispositive pre-trial motion, but litigation of any kind or duration will
impose costs on the employer.
The most obvious way for the employer to avoid a discrimination
claim and the attendant litigation costs is to provide the employee with an
accommodation that she finds acceptable. The employer avoids liability if
the accommodation is "reasonable." However, the employer avoids
litigation costs, regardless of how a court might define "reasonable," only if
the accommodation is sufficient to deter the employee from filing a claim.
The employer need not provide the accommodation that the employee
requested. The employer can provide a more cost-effective
accommodation or an accommodation that is less helpful to the employee
than a court might order.1 56  As long as the employee agrees, the
accommodation delivers the opportunity benefit of avoided litigation costs
to the employer.
Accommodating the employee is not the only way for the employer to
avoid litigation costs. The employer and the employee might agree to a
work arrangement or career path different from that contemplated when the
employer hired the employee. Similarly, the employee and the employer
might separate in an amicable and efficient way, perhaps after a financial
settlement or help from the employer finding a superior job match with
another employer. The ADA does not contemplate amicable separations,
but it also does not prohibit them. The economics of the employment
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relationship may lead the parties to conclude that separation or a
restructuring of their relationship is the most efficient solution. Again, any
agreement that the employee finds acceptable will allow the employer to
avoid litigation costs. The question for the employer is which resolution to
the accommodation problem will result in benefits exceeding costs.
Prospective litigation costs are a part of that calculus.
Avoided litigation costs are a third category of opportunity benefits
that an employer might derive by accommodating an employee with an
impairment. Losing in litigation may impose the greatest costs, but merely
engaging in litigation imposes both direct and indirect costs. Avoiding
these costs also provides opportunity benefits that may change the calculus
of whether an employer benefits from accommodating an employee with an
impairment. However, preventing litigation almost certainly will require
the employer to enter into the interactive process with the employee who is
requesting an accommodation to persuade the employee not to bring a
discrimination claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article joins the debate over the relationship between the ADA's
accommodation mandate and the continuing decline in the employment rate
of working-age people with disabilities. It offers an economic theory, and
analyses built on that theory, which support the discriminatory choice view
of that relationship-that is, the view that the low and declining
employment rate among working-age people with disabilities cannot be
blamed on the ADA's accommodation mandate and any costs it
purportedly imposes on employers. In the absence of this explanation for
the employment-rate decline, there is good reason for concern that its cause
lies with irrational, discriminatory decision making by employers who will
not hire workers with disabilities regardless of any cost-benefit analysis.
Using internal labor market theory, this Article has shown that
accommodating employees with disabilities often imposes no costs on the
employers providing accommodations and, in some circumstances, may
yield net benefits for those employers. Accommodations and workers'
impairments tighten the bonds between the employer and the employee and
make possible a range of cost-cutting and productivity-enhancing behaviors
that yield larger dividends for the employer. For this reason, employment
of people with disabilities is not some predictable consequence of the
operation of a competitive market. Rather, employers and their employees
with disabilities control their economic destinies. Whether these economic
actors take advantage of their opportunities to increase productivity,
efficiency, and employment will play an important role in determining
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whether an employer benefits from accommodating an employee with an
impairment.
This conclusion must be tempered by the limited nature of this
article's inquiry. I have not attempted to offer a global theory of
accommodations and employment. To the contrary, this article warns that
any such effort necessarily encounters the complication of taking into
account important differences in labor markets. This Article addresses only
accommodations issues that arise between incumbent employees and their
employers if those employers have an internal labor market. Nonetheless,
apart from several important empirical studies which this article seeks to
explain with theoretical support, the internal labor market story has been
largely ignored in the debate until now.
